Georgetown University Law Center

Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW

2022

House Rules: Congress and the Attorney-Client Privilege
David Rapallo
rapalldp@georgetown.edu

This paper can be downloaded free of charge from:
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/2476
http://ssrn.com/abstract=4254169

Washington University Law Review, Forthcoming
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, President/Executive Department Commons, and
the Supreme Court of the United States Commons

HOUSE RULES: CONGRESS AND THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
DAVID RAPALLO*
ABSTRACT
In 2020, the Supreme Court rendered a landmark decision in Trump v.
Mazars establishing four factors for determining the validity of
congressional subpoenas for a sitting president’s personal papers. In an
unanticipated move, Chief Justice John Roberts added that recipients of
congressional subpoenas have “long been understood” to retain not only
constitutional privileges, but common law privileges developed by judges,
including the attorney-client privilege. This was particularly surprising
since Trump was not relying on the attorney-client privilege and the Court
had never treated this common law privilege as overriding Congress’s
Article I power to set its own procedures for conducting investigations.
This article examines the merits of this claim from three possible sources
of authority: separation of powers principles, congressional oversight
precedents, and judicial rulings. It concludes that since the attorney-client
privilege is rooted in common law, committees are not required to
recognize it, but may do so if they choose. It also finds that although
recipients of congressional subpoenas may assert applicable constitutional
privileges to withhold certain subsets of attorney-client communications,
these privileges may be limited. Finally, rather than assuming that the Chief
Justice’s line was erroneous dictum or a sweeping new pronouncement with
no explanation, this article offers an alternative reading that gives him the
benefit of the doubt and aligns with current practice: recipients of
congressional subpoenas retain their right to assert the privilege in
separate proceedings, and complying with compulsory demands from
Congress does not constitute a general waiver in other fora.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2019, three House committees—the Committee on Oversight and
Reform, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the
Committee on Financial Services—issued subpoenas to obtain documents
from then-President Donald Trump’s bankers and accountants in response
to a wide range of troubling allegations.1 Trump intervened to fight the
subpoenas, and the Supreme Court, in its landmark decision, Trump v.
Mazars, affirmed several core principles: each House of Congress has
power under the Constitution to conduct investigations, committees may
issue subpoenas to compel the production of documents and testimony, and
no individual has an absolute right to defy congressional demands.2
However, because the case involved the President, the Court observed
that it implicated the separation of powers.3 The Court set forth a new, nonexhaustive list of four factors for courts to evaluate when reviewing
congressional subpoenas for a sitting president’s personal papers: (1)
whether the legislative purposes warrant involving the President and his
papers; (2) whether the subpoena is no broader than reasonably necessary
1.
Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2027–28 (2020) (including that the President
had undisclosed conflicts of interest, violated the Emoluments Clauses, failed to accurately report his
finances to the Office of Government Ethics, was compromised by foreign interests, and was receiving
illicit funds from Russian oligarchs and others).
2.
Id. at 2036 (“When Congress seeks information ‘needed for intelligent legislative action,’ it
‘unquestionably’ remains ‘the duty of all citizens to cooperate.’”) (citing Watkins v. United States, 354
U.S. 178, 187 (1957)) (emphasis in Mazars).
3.
Id. at 2035.
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to support these legislative objectives; (3) whether the evidence offered by
Congress establishes that the subpoena furthers a valid legislative purpose;
and (4) whether the burdens on the President “cross constitutional lines.”4
In an unanticipated move, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court,
also inserted the following aside regarding testimonial privileges for
individuals who receive subpoenas from Congress:
And recipients have long been understood to retain common law and
constitutional privileges with respect to certain materials, such as
attorney-client communications and governmental communications
protected by executive privilege.5
This impromptu declaration was doubly surprising because Trump was not
relying on the attorney-client privilege and the Supreme Court had never
treated common law privileges developed by federal judges as supplanting
Congress’s explicit authority under Article I of the Constitution to set its
own rules to conduct investigations. The Chief Justice drew no distinction
between constitutional privileges that Congress must recognize and
common law privileges that Congress may recognize. He did not explain
under what authority he believes Congress is required to recognize the
common law attorney-client privilege, and he suggested that Congress may
be required to recognize other unspecified common law privileges as well.
Part I of this article examines the merits of the claim that Congress is
required to recognize the common law attorney-client privilege from three
perspectives: separation of powers principles, congressional oversight
precedents, and judicial rulings. It concludes that congressional committees
are not required to recognize non-constitutional common law privileges, but
they may do so if they choose. As one of the oldest privileges based in
common law, the attorney-client privilege has been developed by courts to
serve the widely shared policy goal of promoting trust and confidentiality
in attorney-client relationships. But there is no precedent indicating that it
has a constitutional basis. While committees respect the policy interests
underlying the privilege—and use their discretion routinely to allow
assertions of the privilege in their proceedings—they also safeguard their
authority to overcome the privilege if necessary to fulfill their many
4.
Id. at 2035–36. The Court remanded, and lower courts applied this new standard. See, e.g.,
Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 39 F.4th 774, 779 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (upholding the Committee’s “authority
to subpoena certain of President Trump’s financial records in furtherance of the Committee’s
enumerated legislative purposes,” but narrowing the subpoena “in a number of respects” in light of the
new Mazars factors).
5.
Mazars, 140 S. Ct. at 2032. The Chief Justice followed his sentence with two parallel
citations: LOUIS FISHER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL31836, CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS:
SUBPOENAS AND CONTEMPT POWER 16–18 (2003) [hereinafter “2003 CRS REPORT”] for the common
law attorney-client assertion, and Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon,
498 F.2d 725, 730–731 (D.C. Cir. 1974), for the constitutional executive privilege assertion.
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responsibilities under the Constitution. Under Article I, the decision to
recognize this common law privilege rests with committees themselves and,
absent a committee’s consent, federal courts historically have declined to
intervene when constitutional privileges are not at stake.
Since Congress must recognize applicable constitutional privileges, Part
II takes up constitutional privileges that individuals may assert to withhold
information that could include a subset of attorney-client communications.
For example, a witness may assert the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination, or a president may invoke executive privilege over
presidential communications. Committees must give due weight to these
privileges, and courts evaluate whether these privileges apply. For example,
courts examine whether Fifth Amendment claims are properly invoked, and
they determine whether government communications are sufficiently linked
to presidential decision-making to fall under executive privilege. Courts
also consider whether Congress has overcome these constitutional
privileges, for example, by granting immunity to witnesses who invoke the
Fifth Amendment or making a sufficient showing of need to overcome the
presidential communications privilege. However, once courts decide these
constitutional questions, their task is complete. Courts generally have
avoided deciding whether information sought by Congress would be
covered by common law privileges and instead have left those
determinations where the Constitution leaves them: with Congress.
Part III takes a closer look at the Chief Justice’s position in Mazars. If
he meant to suggest a broad consensus among Congress and the Judiciary
that witnesses may defy congressional subpoenas based on the common law
attorney-client privilege, that claim is simply wrong. Congress has taken the
opposite position for generations, and the Chief Justice did not cite any
judicial precedent to support this interpretation. If he held this inaccurate
view, the line should be disregarded as erroneous dictum, and the Court
should promptly correct this mistake. Another possibility is that the Chief
Justice meant to declare that committees are required—from this point on—
to look to federal courts to decide how and when committees must recognize
the privilege. However, he provided no explanation of the constitutional
authority underpinning this assertion, and there is little evidence that he
intended to make such a remarkable pronouncement, unprompted and
unbriefed.
Acknowledging the perils of trying to divine the Chief Justice’s intent,
there is another interpretation of this line that would give him the benefit of
the doubt. Instead of assuming he was negligent or imperious, his line could
be read as acknowledging that recipients of congressional subpoenas retain
the right to assert the privilege in other venues not directly related to
congressional investigations and that complying with mandatory
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congressional demands does not constitute a general waiver in those other
proceedings. As discussed in Part III, this interpretation gives meaning to
the specific authorities the Chief Justice cited and the particular
congressional investigation he referenced in the opinion, it harmonizes
current law and practice by squarely addressing the (very real) waiver
concerns of practitioners representing clients before Congress, and most
importantly, it comports with separation of powers principles, congressional
oversight precedents, and judicial rulings.
The resolution of these questions could have significant short- and longterm implications. To legislate effectively, committees examine a wide
range of conduct by individuals—including attorneys—who work in
corporate and private sector entities in health, finance, defense, and other
fields. Congress is also charged with examining the conduct of government
officials to expose fraud, waste, and abuse of taxpayer funds, inform the
public, and develop legislation governing the activities of federal agencies.
Curtailing committees’ longstanding practice of examining the conduct of
attorneys would significantly impair the ability of those committees to
obtain relevant information needed for these constitutional purposes.
Forcing committees to relinquish this authority also would shift the balance
of power further towards the executive and judicial branches with no
constitutional basis.6
I. CONGRESSIONAL SUBPOENA POWER AND THE COMMON LAW
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Is Congress required to recognize the judicially developed, common law
attorney-client privilege? The short answer is “no.” Neither separation of
powers principles, congressional oversight precedents, nor judicial
precedents support the position that Congress must do so. I take these up in
that order.
A. Separation of Powers Principles
One of Congress’s core powers is the power to investigate.7 Although
not expressly enumerated in the Constitution, Congress has authority to
6.
Throughout this article, I include details about congressional investigations that may not have
made their way into the academic literature or judicial opinions. My sense, borne of experience, is that
few people may be aware of these cases outside the parties directly involved. In addition to contributing
to the academic debate on this issue, they may serve as a resource for courts and committees reviewing
the precedents of a co-equal branch of government. See Steven Ross, Applicability of the Attorney-Client
Privilege Before Congress, in CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS: LEGAL ISSUES AND PRACTICAL
APPROACHES, 138–39 (1986) (detailing congressional precedents as lex parliamenti).
7.
Mazars, 140 S. Ct. at 2031.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4254169

460

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

VOL. 100:455

conduct investigations and, as part of that power, to issue subpoenas to
compel the production of documents and testimony.8 This power is
extremely broad, and for good reason: it is fundamental to Congress’s
ability to conduct all of its other constitutional responsibilities.9 Although it
has become shorthand to refer to this power as needing to serve a “valid
legislative purpose,”10 the more precise description, in my view, is that it
must serve a valid legislative branch purpose.11 As the Chief Justice
affirmed in Mazars, it must relate to “a legitimate task of the Congress,”12
which includes more than just passing a bill or an amendment.13 This power
is as extensive as the functions the Constitution assigns to Congress.14 As a
constraining principle, the key question is whether a subpoena exceeds the
authority of Congress “under the Constitution.”15 Although this power is not
unlimited,16 it is challenging to identify an investigation that is unrelated to
a legitimate function of Congress, as others have noted.17
8.
Id. (noting that Congress has power “to secure needed information”) (citing McGrain v.
Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 161 (1927) (involving Senate investigation of Justice Department officials
arising out of Teapot Dome scandal)).
9.
Id. at 2031 (noting that the “‘power of inquiry—with process to enforce it—is an essential
and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function,’” and that “[w]ithout information, Congress would
be shooting in the dark, unable to legislate ‘wisely or effectively’”) (citing McGrain, 273 U.S. at 174–
75).
10.
Id. (citing Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957)) (citing Quinn v. United States,
349 U.S. 155, 161 (1955)).
11.
The Constitution grants Congress numerous powers, including to legislate (U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 1), impeach (id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; art. I, § 3, cl. 6), raise revenue (id. art. I, § 7, cl. 1), tax (id. art. I, §
8, cl. 1), establish lower courts (id. art. I, § 8, cl. 9), declare war (id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11), raise an army (id.
art. I, § 8, cl. 12), consent to emoluments (id. art. I, § 9, cl. 8), establish positions for presidential
appointments and advise and consent to presidential nominees (id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2), and make laws
“necessary and proper” for carrying out all other constitutional powers of government (id. art. I, § 8, cl.
18), among others.
12.
Mazars, 140 S. Ct. at 2031 (citing Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187) (emphasis added).
13.
Id. at 2031 (noting that the power to investigate “encompasses inquiries into the
administration of existing laws, studies of proposed laws, and ‘surveys of defects in our social, economic
or political system for the purpose of enabling the Congress to remedy them’”) (citing Watkins, 354 U.S.
at 187).
14.
Id. at 2031 (noting that “congressional power to obtain information is ‘broad’ and
‘indispensable’”) (citing Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187); see also Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109,
111 (1959) (“[T]he scope of the power of inquiry, in short, is as penetrating and far reaching as the
potential power to enact and appropriate under the Constitution.”).
15.
Id. at 2029.
16.
Id. at 2032 (Congress may not issue subpoena for the purpose of “law enforcement”) (citing
Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 161 (1955)); id. (Congress “may not use subpoenas to ‘try’
someone ‘before [a] committee for any crime or wrongdoing’” and has no “‘general’ power to inquire
into private affairs and compel disclosures”) (citing McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 173–74
(1927)). Other cases have explained that subpoenas can be challenged if committees are not properly
authorized to conduct investigations, see, e.g., Gojack v. United States, 384 U.S. 702, 705 (1966), or if
inquiries are not “pertinent” to the investigations. See Watkins, 354 U.S. at 208.
17.
See, e.g., James Hamilton, Overview of the Law Pertaining to Congressional Investigations,
in CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS: LEGAL ISSUES AND PRACTICAL APPROACHES 15 (1986) (noting
that “the doctrine of legislative purpose provides little practical protection”); Michael D. Bopp, Thomas
G. Hungar & Chantalle Carles Schropp, How President Trump’s Tangles with Committees Have
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Critical to this analysis, the Constitution also gives “[e]ach House” of
Congress independent authority to establish its own rules, including for
conducting investigations.18 Pursuant to this authority, the House adopts
rules at the start of every two-year Congress, while the Senate, as a
continuous body, retains its rules from one Congress to the next.19 House
and Senate rules have developed key similarities and critical differences
over time.20 By granting each chamber distinct authority to set its own rules,
the Founders distinguished this unicameral rulemaking authority from
Congress’s other powers, including its authority to pass legislation, which
carries with it the additional requirements of bicameralism and
presentment.21 The Constitution does not require either the House or Senate,
when acting pursuant to its Article I rulemaking authority, to seek or obtain
the consent of the other chamber or the President.22
A fundamental consequence of the structure of Article I and the
separation of powers is that since the attorney-client privilege is based in
the common law instead of the Constitution, Congress may determine how
it will handle assertions of the privilege. In other words, because the
Constitution grants Congress the power to investigate, and since Article I
explicitly gives the House and Senate independent authority to set their own
rules, a common law privilege may not overcome these constitutional
powers. Unless Congress agrees otherwise or a countervailing constitutional
interest is identified, the Constitution grants Congress the authority to
determine whether, when, and how it will recognize the privilege in its own
proceedings. Otherwise, the separation of powers would be upended as

Weakened Congress’s Investigative Powers, 37 J.L. & POL. 1, 10 (2021) (noting that it is “exceptionally
difficult to invalidate a congressional subpoena on the basis that the committee lacked a valid legislative
purpose”). For an even broader view, see Josh Chafetz, Nixon/Trump: Strategies of Judicial
Aggrandizement, 110 GEO. L.J. 125, 141 n.117 (2021) (“[E]ven an investigation for a (currently)
unconstitutional purpose could be justified as an investigation that might potentially lead to a
constitutional amendment, making that (formerly) unconstitutional purpose constitutional.”).
18.
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings.”).
19.
The House adopted its most recent version of the rules in 2021. Rules of the House of
Representatives, H.R. Doc. No. 116-177, 117th Cong. (2021). The Senate last revised its standing rules
on January 24, 2013. Standing Rules of the Senate, S. Doc. No. 113-18, 113th Cong. (2013).
20.
For example, the House utilized the filibuster early in its history, but later abandoned the
procedure, leaving it to the Senate. See GREGORY KOGER, FILIBUSTERING: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF
OBSTRUCTION IN THE HOUSE AND SENATE 37 (2010) (noting that “the fact that filibustering was more
common in the U.S. House than the U.S. Senate shatters the notion that obstruction is somehow peculiar
to the Senate or essential to its purpose in our constitutional system”); Josh Chafetz, Unprecedented?
Judicial Confirmation Battles and the Search for a Usable Past, 131 HARV. L. REV. 96, 111–19 (2017)
(describing evolution of House Rules Committee procedures).
21.
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
22.
Congress’s rulemaking power is similar to other explicit Article I exceptions to bicameralism
and presentment, including the House’s power to impeach (id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5), the Senate’s power to
try impeachments (id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6), and the Senate’s powers to approve or disapprove Presidential
appointments and to ratify treaties (id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2).
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federal courts would be able to impose various types of common law
privileges onto Congress without a constitutional basis.
In the case of the attorney-client privilege, neither the House nor the
Senate has adopted a rule providing witnesses the ability to assert the
privilege as a matter of right. Instead, both chambers have adopted rules
delegating to their committees’ discretion to make rulings on a case-by-case
basis.23 These rules authorize committees to hold hearings and collect
testimony and records, including by issuing subpoenas.24 In addition, both
chambers have authorized committees to adopt their own rules,25 and
committees have used this delegated power to establish systems for
considering assertions of privileges by witnesses.26
Both the House and Senate have rejected amendments to their rules that
would have required committees to apply the common law attorney-client
privilege. For example, the House defeated an amendment to require
recognition of the attorney-client privilege in 1857 when it adopted
legislation to create a criminal contempt statute that applies to individuals
appearing before Congress.27 During debate on the amendment, Rep.
George Dunn of Indiana asked the sponsor of the bill, Rep. James Orr of
South Carolina, whether the bill would exempt attorney-client

23.
See, e.g., Rules of the House of Representatives, R. X, H.R. Doc. No. 116-177 (establishing
committees and jurisdictions); id. R. XI, cl. 1(b)(1) (authorizing each committee to conduct
“investigations and studies as it considers necessary or appropriate in the exercise of its responsibilities
under rule X.”); Standing Rules of the Senate, R. XXV, S. Doc. No. 113-18 (establishing committees
and jurisdictions); id. R. XXVI, cl. 1 (authorizing each committee to “may make investigations into any
matter within its jurisdiction”).
24.
Rules of the House of Representatives, R. XI, cl. 2(m)(1), H.R. Doc. No. 116-177
(authorizing committees “to require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance and testimony of such
witnesses and the production of such books, records, correspondence, memoranda, papers, and
documents as it considers necessary”); id. R. XI, cl. 2(m)(3)(A)(i) (authorizing power to issue subpoenas
to be “delegated to the chair of the committee under such rules and under such limitations as the
committee may prescribe”); Standing Rules of the Senate, R. XXVI, S. Doc. No. 113-18 (authorizing
committees “to hold such hearings, . . . to require by subpoena or otherwise the attendance of such
witnesses and the production of such correspondence, books, papers, and documents, to take such
testimony . . . as may be authorized by resolutions of the Senate”).
25.
Rules of the House of Representatives, R. XI, cl. 2(a)(1), H.R. Doc. No. 116-177 (authorizing
each standing committee to adopt written rules governing its procedures); Standing Rules of the Senate,
R. XXVI, cl. 2, S. Doc. NO. 113-18 (authorizing each committee to adopt rules governing the procedures
of such committee).
26.
S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. &
GOV’TL AFFS., 116TH CONG., RULES OF PROC. R. 9.3 (Comm. Print 2019) (governing the process for
ruling on assertions of privilege); H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & REFORM, 116TH CONG., RULES OF THE
COMM. R. 16 (Comm. Print 2021) (authorizing Chair to rule on assertions of privilege); id. at R. 15(i)
(setting forth processes for handling privilege assertions).
27.
CONG. GLOBE, 34TH CONG., 3d Sess. 432 (1857).
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communications.28 In response, Rep. Orr stated that it would not.29 A similar
amendment was defeated in the Senate.30
Since then, Congress has declined repeatedly to change its rules to
recognize the privilege when opportunities have squarely presented
themselves. For example, the House and Senate rejected amendments in
1954 that would have required the recognition of the attorney-client
privilege.31 This issue arose again when the House voted in 1986 to hold an
attorney and his brother in contempt for refusing to answer questions
relating to the business dealings of Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos
and his wife.32 A House subcommittee had ruled that the attorney-client
privilege was not available as a matter of right before Congress and that it
likely would not have applied under common law in any case.33 Some
commentators urged the House to require its committees to recognize the
attorney-client privilege,34 and two House Members introduced a bill to do
so,35 but the bill died within a few months of being referred to
subcommittee.36
Congress has used its discretion under its Article I rulemaking authority
to grant access to other related, but distinct privileges that are not required
by the Constitution. For example, the House has adopted a rule that allows
witnesses appearing before committees to be accompanied by attorneys

28.
Id. at 431.
29.
Id.
30.
See Jonathan P. Rich, Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege in Congressional Investigations,
88 COLUM. L. REV. 145, 154 (1988) (noting that Senate was not intending to subvert common law
privileges, but rather meant to reflect its sense that amendments were unnecessary given Senate’s own
“legislative respect for these privileges”).
31.
Thomas Millet, The Applicability of Evidentiary Privileges for Confidential Communications
Before Congress, 21 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 309, 316 (1988) (citing S. RULES COMM., 83RD CONG.,
RULES OF PROC. FOR S. INVESTIGATING COMMS. 27 (Comm. Print 1955) (noting that “committee
practice,” with some exceptions, has been to observe attorney-client and other common law privileges)).
32.
132 CONG. REC. 3061 (1986).
33.
H. COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFS., PROCEEDINGS AGAINST RALPH BERNSTEIN AND JOSEPH
BERNSTEIN, H.R. REP. NO. 99-462 (1985), as reprinted in 132 CONG. REC. 3028–40 (1986) (“After due
consideration, the subcommittee overruled these claims, and, when the witnesses continued their
resistance, held the witnesses to be in contempt of Congress, based on the legal advice of the general
counsel to the Clerk of the House, and the minority counsel of the House, that the claims were without
merit.”)
34.
See, e.g., James Hamilton, Can Congress Make Lawyers Talk?, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 1986,
at A17, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1986/03/25/can-congress-make-lawyerstalk/8f7ec276-9d5c-41b2-aeb2-b3f9be4f9f55/ [https://perma.cc/WU4B-SR45].
35.
The Attorney-Client Privilege Act of 1986, H.R. 4245, 99th Cong. (introduced Feb. 26,
1986).
36.
The last action taken on the bill was that it was “Referred to Subcommittee on Criminal
Justice” by the House Committee on the Judiciary on April 7, 1986. See All Actions H.R.4245—99th
Congress
(1985-1986),
CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/99th-congress/housebill/4245/all-actions?r=2& overview=closed&s=4#tabs [https://perma.cc/GWZ5-SD2V] (last visited
Sept. 23, 2022).
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even though there is no express constitutional requirement to do so.37
Because the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies in relation to
criminal proceedings,38 floor debate on this rule made clear that allowing
congressional witnesses to be accompanied by counsel was a narrow
“privilege” granted by the House.39 Members explained that because they
were adopting this rule to promote public policy goals rather than as a
constitutional requirement, they were limiting the privilege as they deemed
appropriate.40 Attorneys who represent congressional witnesses know well
that the privilege of accompanying their clients to hearings does not entitle
lawyers to present arguments, make motions, question witnesses, or make
demands of the committee.41 These limitations—including not being able to
speak at certain congressional proceedings—is a significant difference for
attorneys accustomed to practicing in federal courts,42 but it conforms with
longstanding congressional precedent.43
Congress has also used its rulemaking authority to adopt other provisions
governing the conduct of attorneys who practice before it. Senate
37.
Rules of the House of Representatives, R. XI, cl. 2(k)(3), H.R. Doc. No. 116-177, 117th
Cong. (2021).
38.
U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
39.
4 DESCHLER’S PRECEDENTS OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 2275, 2386 (1994)
(citing 101 CONG. REC. 3569, 3572, 3582, 3583, 84th Cong. 1st Sess. (1955)) (when Rep. George
Meader asked, “Would the absence of counsel where a witness demands the right to have counsel present
vitiate the legal status of the inquiry?,” Rep. Howard W. Smith responded, “By no means. This is merely
a privilege given to him.”).
40.
Id. at 2387 (citing 101 CONG. REC. 3582, 84th Cong. 1st Sess. (1955)) (Rep. Kenneth Keating
stated that “[t]here is no specific basis for the right of a witness to be accompanied and advised by his
counsel, nor for recognition of the traditional privileges of lawyer and client, doctor and patient, priest
and penitent, and the like” and that it is “only a matter of drawing the lines clearly and precisely where
we wish them to lie”) (emphasis added).
41.
Id. at 2388, § 14.3; see also id. at 2389, § 14.5 (“A House committee has discretion to refuse
to allow demands of counsel at an investigative hearing and it may reject an attorney’s demand that
certain evidence be taken in executive session or require the witness personally to raise the issue.”).
42.
See also Andrew McCanse Wright, Congressional Due Process, 85 MISS. L.J. 401, 403
(2016) (noting surprise of those under investigation when they learn that Congress does not provide the
same procedures as federal courts for “a whole panoply of fundamental concepts of procedural
fairness—right to counsel, regulation of discovery, neutrality of arbiters, safeguarding of confidential
information, right of confrontation, common law privileges, rights of privacy”).
43.
THOMAS JEFFERSON, JEFFERSON’S MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE 170–71 (1801)
(“Counsel are to be heard only on private, not on public, bills and on such points of law only as the
House shall direct.”) (citation omitted). A typical example occurred at a hearing in 2016, during which
an attorney representing Martin Shkreli, a drug company executive accused of bilking customers, sought
recognition:
[Counsel:] Mr. Chairman, may I be recognized for a moment?
Chairman CHAFFETZ: No. No, you are not allowed to. Under the House rules, you have not
been sworn in.
[Counsel:] I understand, but he is making—
Chairman CHAFFETZ: You are not recognized. You are not recognized, and you will be
seated.
Developments in the Prescription Drug Market: Oversight: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight
& Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. 65 (2016).
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committees may eject counsel from their proceedings,44 and House
committees are authorized to remove attorneys and punish them through
censure or contempt if warranted.45 The rules of the Senate’s primary
investigative body, the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, provide
that in cases of potential conflicts of interest, witnesses may be represented
only by personal counsel and not by counsel from government or corporate
entities with which they are affiliated.46 Similarly, the House has authorized
committees to exclude government counsel from depositions of federal
employees.47 The House’s primary investigative body, the Committee on
Oversight and Reform, has exercised this authority to exclude agency
counsel from depositions of federal employees when their presence could
intimidate deponents or undermine the veracity of their testimony.48 Chairs
of both parties have deposed a long line of high-level executive branch
officials without agency counsel in attendance under this rule.49
In addition to safeguarding its own Article I rulemaking authority,
Congress has exercised its constitutional lawmaking power to set, restrict,
and in some circumstances, even abolish the common law attorney-client
privilege within the proceedings of the judicial and executive branches.
There would be a fundamental incongruity, or at least an oddity, if Congress
could pass laws establishing how the attorney-client privilege applies to
proceedings in the other two branches, but not its own.50
44.
S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. &
GOV’TL AFFAIRS, 116TH CONG., RULES OF PROC. R. 8 (Comm. Print 2019).
45.
Rules of the House of Representatives, R. XI, cl. 2(k)(4), H.R. Doc. No. 116-177, 117th
Cong. (2021).
46.
S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. &
GOV’TL AFFAIRS, 116TH CONG., RULES OF PROC. R. 8 (Comm. Print 2019).
47.
167 CONG. REC. H41 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 2021) (“Witnesses may be accompanied at a
deposition by personal, nongovernmental counsel to advise them of their rights.”); see also Rules of the
House of Representatives, R. X, cl. 4(c)(3), H.R. Doc. No. 116-177 (authorizing Committee to “adopt a
rule authorizing and regulating the taking of depositions by a member or counsel of the committee,
including pursuant to subpoena”); STAFF OF H. COMM ON OVERSIGHT & REFORM, 116TH CONG., RULES
OF THE H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & REFORM R. 15 (Comm. Print 2019).
48.
STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & REFORM, 116TH CONG., REP. ON COMM. DEPOSITIONS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: LONGSTANDING REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC PRACTICE OF
EXCLUDING AGENCY COUNSEL 1 (Comm. Print 2019) (“The deposition rule that excludes agency
counsel is intended for exactly these types of circumstances—to prevent agency officials who are
directly implicated in the abuses we are investigating from trying to prevent their own employees from
coming forward to tell the truth to Congress.”).
49.
Id. (citing 141 depositions with personal counsel and without agency counsel conducted by
Rep. Dan Burton as Chairman of the House Committee on Government Reform, including White House
Chief of Staff Mack McLarty, White House Chief of Staff Erskine Bowles, White House Counsel
Bernard Nussbaum, White House Counsel Jack Quinn, Deputy White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey,
Deputy White House Counsel Cheryl Mills, Deputy White House Chief of Staff Harold Ickes, Chief of
Staff to the Vice President Roy Neel, and Chief of Staff to the First Lady Margaret Williams) (footnote
omitted).
50.
See, e.g., Millet, supra note 31, at 320 (“Nothing in the Constitution compels Congress to
respect privileged communications. Indeed, no one would dispute that Congress could adopt legislation
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In the judicial context, Congress passed legislation establishing the
Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975 to govern common law privileges, but
explicitly limited the application of the rules to federal judicial
proceedings.51 The Supreme Court originally proposed that Congress set
forth the scope of each common law privilege explicitly in the rules.52
Instead, Congress chose to allow federal courts to continue using common
law principles, essentially deferring to the courts to carry on developing
these privileges using their best judgment for use in federal courts.53 As a
result, Rule 501 now provides: “The common law—as interpreted by United
States courts in the light of reason and experience—governs a claim of
privilege.”54 However, Congress extended its deference only to proceedings
in federal courts and did not authorize the judiciary to decide when or how
common law privileges apply in congressional proceedings or in state
courts.55 Some have suggested that since Congress established the Federal
Rules of Evidence allowing federal courts to recognize the common law
attorney-client privilege, Congress must recognize this privilege in its own
proceedings.56 This argument is undercut by the rules themselves: Rule
101(a) provides that these rules apply only to proceedings in United States
courts;57 and Rule 1101(a) delineates the specific federal judicial fora to
which the rules apply.58
Like Congress, states also have exercised their independent authority to
make their own determinations regarding common law privileges, including
the attorney-client privilege. For example, in 2016, the Washington
Supreme Court issued a decision finding that the attorney-client privilege
does not apply to communications with a company’s former employees
affecting the role of privileges in judicial proceedings. It follows, then, that Congress is not required to
follow these privileges in its own arena.”) (footnote omitted).
51.
Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926.
52.
H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 8 (1973) (proposing that Congress
set forth “non-constitutional privileges which the federal courts must recognize”) (emphasis added); see
also S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 11 (1974).
53.
H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 8.
54.
FED. R. EVID. 501.
55.
H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 1 (purpose of legislation is to “provide a uniform code of evidence
for use in the Federal courts”) (emphasis added).
56.
Bradley J. Bondi, No Secrets Allowed: Congress’s Treatment and Mistreatment of the
Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Protection in Congressional Investigations and
Contempt Proceeding, 25 J. L. & POL. 145, 146 (2009) (arguing that because the attorney-client privilege
was “codified by Congress” through this legislation, “nothing within Congress’s powers should allow it
to abrogate this longstanding right”).
57.
FED. R. EVID. 101 (Scope; Definitions).
58.
FED. R. EVID. 1101 (Applicability of Rules, To Courts and Judges) (applying to proceedings
before United States district courts, bankruptcy and magistrate judges, courts of appeals, the Court of
Federal Claims, and the district courts of Guam, the Virgin Islands, and the Northern Mariana Islands).
Although Bondi noted that the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 501 “unequivocally state that the
attorney-client privilege is one of the privileges that federal courts ‘must’ recognize,” those notes do not
state that Congress must do so. Bondi, supra note 56, at 149 (citation omitted).
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even if the communications relate to the individual’s employment.59
Although the state court decided to adopt the U.S. Supreme Court’s general
approach to the privilege in corporate contexts, it rejected its application to
postemployment communications with former employees.60 The state court
acknowledged that federal courts have taken a different position, citing in
particular the position of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.61 But the state
court nevertheless decided to make its own determination that expanding
the privilege in this way would frustrate “the truthseeking mission of the
legal process.”62
Federal courts have respected state determinations on the scope of the
attorney-client privilege. For example, in Beckler v. Superior Court, Los
Angeles County, the Ninth Circuit upheld a decision by the California
Supreme Court that the state’s attorney-client privilege did not extend to an
attorney subpoenaed by a grand jury for business records in his possession
over which his client had attempted to assert a Fifth Amendment claim
against self-incrimination.63 Since this was a proceeding before California
state courts, the Ninth Circuit held: “[T]he attorney-client privilege is a
matter of state law, for determination by the California courts. It is not a
matter of Constitutional law under the Fifth Amendment.”64
The Supreme Court has recognized the right of states to make their own
policy determinations with respect to these non-constitutional privileges.
For example, in Jaffee v. Redmond, the Court, using authority delegated by
Congress under Rule 501 “to define new privileges by interpreting
‘common law principles . . . in the light of reason and experience’,”
recognized a new psychotherapist-patient privilege in federal courts.65 In
informing its determination, the Court looked to the states for guidance on
the various ways they had chosen to handle the privilege in their
jurisdictions, noting that “the policy decisions of the States bear on the
question whether federal courts should recognize a new privilege or amend

59.
Newman v. Highland Sch. Dist. No. 203, 381 P.3d 1188, 1192 (Wash. 2016) (en banc); see
also Peter R. Jarvis, Washington Supreme Court Creates Bright-Line Rule, HOLLAND & KNIGHT ALERT
(Oct. 26, 2016) (describing Washington Supreme Court as taking “what is, on a national basis, a minority
position”) [https://perma.cc/9S3K-2R4F].
60.
Newman, 381 P.3d at 1192.
61.
Id. at 1194 (citing In re Allen, 106 F.3d 582, 605–06 (4th Cir. 1997) (collecting cases)).
62.
Id. at 1194 (citing United States v. Tedder, 801 F.2d 1437, 1441 (4th Cir. 1986) (citing United
States v. (Under Seal), 748 F.2d 871, 875 (4th Cir. 1984))).
63.
Beckler v. Superior Ct., Los Angeles Cnty., 568 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1978).
64.
Id. at 662 (also noting that the attorney-client privilege under federal rules does not assume
“Constitutional dimensions” (citing Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976)).
65.
Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 8 (1996) (citing FED. R. EVID. 501). The Court also noted
that when Congress enacted Rule 501, it “did not freeze the law governing the privileges of witnesses in
federal trials at a particular point in our history, but rather directed federal courts to ‘continue the
evolutionary development of testimonial privileges.’” Id. at 9 (citations omitted).
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the coverage of an existing privilege.”66 The Court also noted that if the
petitioner in this case had brought her case in state court instead of federal
court, the state privilege would have applied.67 Throughout its opinion, the
Court made direct comparisons to the attorney-client and other privileges,
recognizing “the common-law principles underlying the recognition of
testimonial privileges.”68 Certainly, if Congress had disagreed with the
Court’s decision to recognize this new common law privilege, it could have
exercised its lawmaking authority once again to amend the Federal Rules of
Evidence accordingly.
Congress has also used its legislative power to recognize the independent
authority of states to make their own determinations on common law
privileges by directing federal courts—through the Federal Rules of
Evidence—to apply state privileges in civil diversity cases involving state
claims or defenses.69 Jonathan Rich has suggested that, in requiring federal
courts to apply state privileges in diversity suits, Congress must have
recognized the attorney-client privilege as a “substantive” right, rather than
a procedural one, under the jurisdictional principles of Erie v. Tompkins,
which established that federal courts sitting in diversity suits generally must
apply state substantive law.70 However, as Glenn Beard has countered,
referring to a privilege as substantive in diversity cases does not authorize
federal courts to impose their own interpretation of the privilege onto
congressional proceedings, particularly when Congress explicitly restricted
the application of those rules only to federal courts.71 This argument also
disregards the fact that committees continued to make clear—directly after
Congress passed the Federal Rules of Evidence and since—that they retain
authority to decide claims of attorney-client privilege in their own
proceedings.72

66.
Id. at 12–13 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The Court also noted that while all states
have some version of the privilege, there are many differences in how states choose to apply it. For
example, some states limit the privilege only to psychiatrists and psychologists, while others extend it
to behavioral health professionals and others. Id. at 14 n. 13.
67.
Id. at 15 n. 15.
68.
Id. at 9–10 (emphasis added) (observing that the psychotherapist-patient privilege, like the
spousal and attorney-client privileges, serves broad public policy interests).
69.
FED. R. EVID. 501.
70.
Rich, supra note 30, at 161–66 (referencing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).
71.
Glenn A. Beard, Congress v. The Attorney-Client Privilege: “A Full and Frank” Discussion,
35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 119, 132–33 (1997) (“Rule 501 expressly applies only to the courts and it is,
therefore, difficult to comprehend how its labeling of privileges as ‘substantive’ gives a federal court
authority to restrict Congress’s constitutional investigatory and rule-making powers by mandating
recognition of the attorney-client privilege.”).
72.
See generally Int’l Uranium Cartel: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight &
Investigations of the H. Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Com., 95th Cong. (1977) (discussed in Part I.C.
below).
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Since federal courts defer to states to exercise their own independent
judgment on how to handle assertions of the common law attorney-client
privilege, they should also defer to Congress as a co-equal branch of
government. Different congressional committees certainly may take
different approaches, with some choosing to recognize the privilege
consistently and others overruling it on a case-by-case basis.73 However, the
fact that some observers might prefer more consistency among committees
does not mean the Constitution requires them to do so.74 The same criticism
could be made of states that apply the privilege differently based on their
own public policy determinations.75
In the executive branch context, Congress has exercised its lawmaking
power to define the contours of the attorney-client privilege in federal
agencies, while again preserving its own authority to make these
determinations for itself. For example, when Congress passed the Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA), it included a deliberative process exemption
granting agencies authority to withhold internal documents that would not
be available to parties in litigation.76 This exemption has been interpreted to
allow agencies to withhold attorney-client information from the public.77
However, Congress also included a provision prohibiting agencies from
using this exception to withhold information from Congress.78
In addition, in 2016, Congress amended the 1978 Inspector General Act
to clarify that the original law prevented federal agencies from withholding
attorney-client information from their Inspectors General.79 When Congress
first passed the law, it authorized these agency watchdogs to conduct
internal audits and investigations to promote the economy, efficiency, and
73.
See, e.g., AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWS., THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS 8 (2010) (noting that allowing committees to decide for themselves
whether to recognize the attorney-client privilege on a case-by-case basis results in a lack of
consistency).
74.
Ross, supra note 6, at 136 (“To say that there is a varying degree of acceptance of the
privilege before different committees just proves the point that it is a matter of discretion . . . . That some
committees have accepted claims of privilege may say something about the specific claims of privilege
and may say something about the specific committees, but does not necessarily lead to a specific
conclusion as to the overall applicability of the privilege.”).
75.
See Newman v. Highland Sch. Dist. No. 203, 381 P.3d 1188, 1192 (Wash. 2016) (en banc);
see also Michael D. Bopp & DeLisa Lay, The Availability of Common Law Privileges for Witnesses in
Congressional Investigations, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, 897, 909–16 (2012) (discussing how the
“functional equivalent test,” which extends the attorney-client privilege to individuals who are
associated with, but not employed by, corporations, “has been adopted and modified in different ways
by courts in the Second, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits”) (citations omitted).
76.
Act of June 5, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-23, § 552, 81 Stat. 54–55 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §
552(b)(5)).
77.
NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 154 (1975).
78.
§ 552, 81 Stat. at 54–55 (1967) (“This section is not authority to withhold information from
Congress.”).
79.
Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101–09 (codified at 5 U.S.C.
App. 3).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4254169

470

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

VOL. 100:455

effectiveness of agency programs.80 Importantly, Congress explicitly
directed agency Inspectors General to report their findings both to agency
heads and to Congress,81 and the law provided Inspectors General with
authority to access all information they need to fulfill these
responsibilities.82 In 2016, Congress amended the law to make clear that
agencies may not withhold attorney-client or other information from
Inspectors General unless Congress enacts a law expressly limiting the right
of Inspectors General to access this information.83 In other words, Congress
made clear that executive branch agencies may not assert the attorney-client
privilege to withhold information from their Inspectors General.84 One
prominent supporter of this legislation was then-Representative Mark
Meadows, who later became President Trump’s chief of staff. In a statement
on the House floor during debate on this legislation, Meadows explained
that he supported this clarification because the Inspector General of the
Environmental Protection Agency had been denied access to documents
based on what Meadows referred to as “a phony attorney-client privilege
claim.”85
Since the attorney-client privilege is based in common law, either the
House or Senate could decide to use its independent Article I rulemaking
authority to adopt a uniform rule regarding its applicability. Either the
House or Senate could require its committees to recognize the privilege in
all cases or in certain limited cases. In fact, neither has opted to do so.
Instead, both chambers have continued to delegate this authority to their
committees. That is squarely their prerogative under the Constitution.
B. Congressional Oversight Precedents
For generations, congressional committees conducting investigations
have distinguished between constitutional privileges they must recognize
and common law privileges they may recognize. Because the attorney-client
privilege is based in common law, committees have respected the policy
80.
Id. at § 2(2).
81.
Id. at § 2(3) (requiring Inspectors General to keep “Congress fully and currently informed
about problems and deficiencies relating to the administration of such programs and operations and the
necessity for and progress of corrective action”).
82.
Id. at § 6(a)(1) (authorizing access to “all records, reports, audits, reviews, documents,
papers, recommendations, or other material available to the applicable establishment which relate to
programs and operations with respect to which that Inspector General has responsibilities under this
Act”).
83.
Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-317, § 5, 130 Stat. 1595,
1603–04.
84.
See also OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEPT. OF STATE, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 1
(2018) (“The Department does not have an attorney-client or deliberative-process privilege regarding
OIG requests for information.”).
85.
162 CONG. REC. 9570 (2016) (statement of Rep. Mark Meadows).
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interests underlying the privilege even as they have safeguarded their right
not to recognize it in certain cases. There is significant historical precedent
for this position, which Congress has set forth repeatedly in legislative
reports,86 subpoena instructions and staff reports,87 committee rules,88
contempt citations,89 and legal opinions issued by the Library of Congress90
and the House Counsel’s Office.91
1. Congressional Precedents on Attorney-Client Privilege
When examining congressional precedents on the common law attorneyclient privilege, it may be helpful to briefly review how committee
86.
See, e.g., H. PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTEL., REP. ON INTELLIGENCE
AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2000, H.R. REP. NO. 106-130, at 36 (1999) (views of Chairman
Porter J. Goss) (“Each chamber delegates the authority to rule on objections to the production of
documents, such as claims of attorney-client privilege, to its various committees. The rules of judicial
procedure are not applicable to congressional inquiries.”).
87.
See, e.g., H. COMM. ON FIN. SERV., Subpoena to Timothy J. Sloan, Chief Exec. Officer and
President, Wells Fargo & Co. (Aug. 28, 2017), as reprinted in STAFF OF H. COMM. ON FIN. SERV., REP.
ON DID THE CFPB LET WELLS FARGO “BEAT THE RAP”?: APPENDIX TO SECOND INTERIM MAJORITY
STAFF REPORT ON THE WELLS FARGO FRAUDULENT ACCOUNTS SCANDAL, 546 (Comm. Print 2017)
(“[T]he Committee does not recognize: any purported non-disclosure privileges associated with the
common law including, but not limited to, the deliberative-process privilege, the attorney-client
privilege, and attorney work product protections.”).
88.
See, e.g., RULES OF THE H. COMM. ON SCIENCE, SPACE & TECHNOLOGY, 117TH CONG., R.
III(d) (“Claims of common-law privileges made by witnesses in hearings, or by interviewees or
deponents in investigations or inquiries, are applicable only at the discretion of the Chair, subject to
appeal to the Committee.”).
89.
See, e.g., H. COMM. ON COM., CONTEMPT OF CONGRESS AGAINST FRANKLIN L. HANEY, H.R.
REP. NO. 105-792, at 11 (1998) (“The historic position of the House of Representatives is that
committees of Congress are not bound to recognize any non-Constitutional privilege, such as the
attorney-client privilege.”).
90.
See, e.g., Am. L. Div., Libr. of Cong., Availability of Attorney-Client Privilege Before
Congressional Committees, at 21–22 (1982), as reprinted in H. COMM. ON ENERGY & COM.,
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE, NO. 98-I, at 23–24 (Comm. Print 1983) (“[T]he suggestion that the
investigatory authority of the legislative branch of government is subject to non-constitutional, common
law rules, developed by the judicial branch to govern its proceedings arguably is contrary to the concept
of separation of powers. It would, in effect, permit the judiciary to determine congressional procedures
and is therefore difficult to reconcile with the constitutional authority granted each House of Congress
to determine its own rules.”); see also Am. L. Div., Libr. of Cong., Ability of a Congressional Comm. to
Obtain Documents and Testimony from a Corporation in the Face of an Assertion of the Attorney-Client
Privilege and a Claim of Foreign Illegality (May 24, 1983), as reprinted in COMM. ON ENERGY & COM.,
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE, NO. 98-I, at 54 (Comm. Print 1983).
91.
See, e.g., Off. of the Clerk, H.R., Memorandum Opinion of General Counsel to the Clerk of
the House of Representatives on Attorney-Client Privilege (1985), as reprinted in 132 CONG. REC. 3019,
3036–38 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1986) (opinion issued for the House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, overruling attorney-client privilege assertion in contempt
citations of Ralph and Joseph Bernstein when they refused to answer questions about business dealings
with Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos and his wife) (“[T]he House has taken a limited view as to
the applicability of attorney-client privilege. It has entertained, as a matter of discretion claims to that
effect. However, where the House Subcommittee has determined that the legislature need for the
information to facilitate the conduct of the public business requires productions such production has
been required.”).
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investigations work. Although there are a number of excellent primers on
this topic,92 one of the most authoritative and comprehensive is the
Congressional Oversight Manual issued by Congress’s research arm, the
Congressional Research Service (CRS).93
As CRS explains, a committee typically begins by sending voluntary
request letters seeking information in the form of documents or testimony.94
Although most request letters are honored, in some cases recipients object
to the scope or substance of requests and decline to produce some or all of
the documents or testimony.95 The committee may insist on full compliance
with its original request, or it could try to negotiate an accommodation, a
process that can last for some time as the parties go back and forth on date
ranges, search terms, topic areas, or other issues.96 If a dispute cannot be
resolved, the committee could issue a subpoena compelling the witness to
produce the documents or testify at a deposition or hearing.97
If the witness asserts a privilege to withhold documents or testimony, the
committee typically examines whether the privilege derives from the
Constitution or common law.98 As CRS explains, “Whereas committees
must recognize and accept properly asserted constitutional privileges during
an investigation, it has generally been the congressional view that
investigative committees are not bound by court-created common-law
privileges.”99 If the witness asserts the common law attorney-client
privilege, the committee weighs its investigative need for information
against the public policy interests served by the privilege and any possible
harm to the witness.100 Committees consider multiple factors, including the
strength of the privilege assertion in light of the pertinency of the
information sought, whether the information might be available from other
sources, whether the privilege would have been available if it had been

92.
The Carl Levin Center for Oversight and Democracy at Wayne State University Law School
keeps a list of helpful primers on its website. Oversight Manuals, LEVIN CENTER FOR OVERSIGHT AND
DEMOCRACY,
https://levin-center.org/congressional-lawmakers/congressional-oversight-resources/
oversight-manuals/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2022) [https://perma.cc/Z3PW-NTFX].
93.
CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, TODD GARVEY & BEN WILHEM, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL30240,
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT MANUAL (Mar. 31, 2021) [hereinafter “CRS CONGRESSIONAL
OVERSIGHT MANUAL”]. This publication is updated regularly with new information on congressional
investigations, executive branch activities, and judicial rulings.
94.
Id. at 45.
95.
Id. (citing Todd David Peterson, Contempt of Congress v. Executive Privilege, 14 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 77, 105 (2011) (noting that “Congress routinely obtains massive amounts of information from
the executive branch on a daily basis,” often through “informal requests from congressional staffers for
information from a particular staffer.”)).
96.
Id. at 45–46.
97.
Id. at 46–48.
98.
Id. at 61.
99.
Id. at 61–62.
100. Id. at 62.
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raised in federal court, and whether witnesses are cooperating with the
investigation.101
To assist with this assessment, the committee could request that the
witness produce a privilege log, which is a list of documents being withheld
by the witness, accompanied by basic information about each document,
such as the author, recipient, date, and type of document.102 After reviewing
the privilege log, the committee could narrow its request to focus on
documents that appear most relevant, or it could negotiate accommodations
to allow witnesses to provide information through other means that do not
implicate privilege concerns.103 If the committee suspects assertions of
privilege are overbroad or are being abused, it could seek to review a
sampling of documents in camera.104 If the witness refuses to comply with
the subpoena, the committee could vote to hold the individual in contempt
and send the contempt resolution to the full House or Senate for
consideration.105 Once approved, the committee could seek enforcement

101. Id. at 63 (citing Int’l Uranium Cartel: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight &
Investigations of the H. Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Com., 95th Cong. 60 (1977) (adding that a “valid
claim of attorney-client privilege is likely to receive substantial weight,” while “[d]oubt as to the validity
of the asserted claim, however, may diminish the force of such a claim”).
102. See, e.g., H. COMM ON OVERSIGHT & REFORM, 117TH CONG., RULES OF THE H. COMM. ON
OVERSIGHT & REFORM R. 16(c)(2) (Comm. Print 2021) (requiring a privilege log “upon a demand from
the Chair” with “(a) every privilege asserted; (b) the type of document; (c) the general subject matter;
(d) the date, author, addressee, and any other recipients; (e) the relationship of the author and addressee
to each other; and (f) the basis for the privilege asserted”).
103. Harold R. Henderson, Vice President & Gen. Couns., Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., Practical
Problems of In-House and Retained Counsel in the Investigation Process, in CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATIONS: LEGAL ISSUES AND PRACTICAL APPROACHES 186 (“In every instance a mechanism
was found which would serve both the Company’s interest in protecting certain information or avoiding
overburdensome production of a multitude of documents and the investigator’s interest in obtaining
necessary information.”).
104. See, e.g., STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, 115TH CONG., REP. ON
MISCONDUCT, RETALIATION, AND OBSTRUCTION AT THE TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN. (Comm. Print 2018);
see infra notes 134–144 and accompanying text. A committee also could take a more aggressive position,
calling a deposition or hearing for the purpose of having the witness explain under oath why information
is being withheld. See, e.g., H. SELECT COMM. TO INVESTIGATE THE JAN. 6TH ATTACK ON THE U.S.
CAPITOL, DEPOSITION OF JEFFREY CLARK 36 (Nov. 5, 2021) (refusing to answer questions from Rep.
Jamie Raskin about Clark’s assertion of attorney-client privilege, leading the committee to hold him in
contempt).
105. CRS CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT MANUAL, supra note 93, at 48–49.
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through criminal contempt106 or civil litigation.107 Both chambers also have
“inherent” contempt authority to try and punish individuals directly,
although this remedy has not been used in recent years.108
In practice, committees regularly recognize the strong interests served
by the attorney-client privilege and use their discretion to routinely accept
requests not to produce documents or testimony that would be covered by
the privilege in court. Attorneys who represent clients on Capitol Hill
readily acknowledge that it is “very, very common” for committees to
recognize the privilege.109 They note that although Congress is not required
to do so, it “generally accommodates a witness’s legitimate assertions of
attorney-client privilege.”110 For example, during the Iran-Contra hearings,
Richard Secord, Albert Hakim, and Oliver North were allowed to invoke
the privilege with respect to a meeting attended by Secord’s attorney, who
was acting as counsel for all three.111
In light of these congressional precedents, it is difficult to understand the
basis for Chief Justice Roberts’s statement in Mazars that it has “long been
understood” that recipients of congressional subpoenas retain the common
106. Id. at 49–50; see 2 U.S.C. §§ 192, 194. The House or Senate may vote to refer an enforcement
action to the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, who is required to bring the matter before a
grand jury, but for executive branch officials, the U.S. Attorney has followed the direction of the Justice
Department not to bring cases against federal employees when the President asserts executive privilege.
See, e.g., Letter from Jeffrey A. Rosen, Deputy Att’y Gen., to Nancy Pelosi, House Speaker (July 24,
2019) (declining to prosecute Attorney General William Barr and Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross in
Census citizenship question investigation). With respect to former Trump aides Steve Bannon and Peter
Navarro, the Justice Department followed the determination of sitting president Joe Biden, who declined
to assert executive privilege over documents or testimony subpoenaed by the January 6 Committee. See,
e.g., Letter from Dana A. Remus, Couns. to the President, to David Ferriero, Archivist of the U.S. (Oct.
8, 2021) (“The constitutional protections of executive privilege should not be used to shield, from
Congress or the public, information that reflects a clear and apparent effort to subvert the Constitution
itself.”). With little explanation, however, the Justice Department declined to prosecute former White
House Chief of Staff Mark Meadows and former White House adviser Dan Scavino for refusing to
comply with subpoenas from the January 6 Committee, even without an assertion of executive privilege.
See, e.g., Alan Feuer & Luke Broadwater, Navarro Indicted as Justice Dept. Opts Not to Charge
Meadows and Scavino, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2022) https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/03/us/politics/
peter-navarro-contempt-jan-6.html [https://perma.cc/X24V-GKR8] (citing Letter from Matthew M.
Graves, U.S. Att’y for the Dist. of Colum., to Douglas N. Letter, H. Couns. (June 3, 2022)).
107. CRS CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT MANUAL, supra note 93, at 50–52.
108. Id. at 52–55 (noting that although neither house has exercised inherent contempt power since
the 1930s, Senator Sam Ervin, the Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign
Activities, “invoked the inherent contempt power several times to encourage compliance with the
committee’s requests for information during its investigation of the Nixon Administration”).
109. See, e.g., John Grabow, Ginsburg, Feldman & Bress, Chartered, Practical Problems of InHouse and Retained Counsel in the Investigation Process, in CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS: LEGAL
ISSUES AND PRACTICAL APPROACHES 221 (1986).
110. Bopp & Lay, supra note 75, at 907 (noting that, since many members of Congress are
attorneys, “it is likely that they would take pause before voting to hold in contempt a witness who has a
legitimate privilege claim”).
111. MORTON ROSENBERG, WHEN CONGRESS COMES CALLING: A STUDY ON THE PRINCIPLES,
PRACTICES, AND PRAGMATICS OF LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY 69 n.32 (2017) (noting that assertions of
attorney-client privilege before committees “often have gone unchallenged”).
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law attorney-client privilege.112 His assertion is even more perplexing given
that his only citation for this claim was to a 2003 report by CRS that does
not support his position.113 That CRS report states that witnesses before
Congress “may invoke certain constitutional privileges,” such as the Fifth
Amendment, but it does not state that Congress must recognize the common
law attorney-client privilege.114 In fact, when another CRS official was
asked during a subsequent congressional hearing if the 2003 CRS report
supports Chief Justice Roberts’s assertion in Mazars, the official stated that
it did not.115 Other experts who testified at the hearing agreed.116
Indeed, it would have been inaccurate—and surprising—for the Chief
Justice to have cited Congress’s own research arm for the proposition that
committees lack authority to make their own determinations on assertions
of attorney-client privilege. CRS has issued reports year after year after year
highlighting precisely the opposite conclusion: while committees must
recognize applicable constitutional privileges, they retain discretion to make
their own determinations on common law privileges.117 These CRS reports,
112. See Millet, supra note 31, at 318 (“Privileges for confidential communications rest on the
policy grounds that confidentiality is needed to preserve basic relationships for which society accords a
favored status. These policies clearly apply in congressional proceedings. The Constitution gives to
Congress the power to determine whether to give effect to those policies.”); Beard, supra note 71, at 134
(“Simply put, if Congress finds that the public policy driving an investigation outweighs the policy
underlying the attorney-client privilege, it should exercise its authority as the ultimate arbiter of public
policy to overrule the claim of privilege.”).
113. Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2031 (2020) (citing 2003 CRS REPORT, supra
note 5, at 16–18).
114. 2003 CRS REPORT, supra note 5, at 9.
115. Todd Garvey, Legislative Att’y, Cong. Rsch. Serv., Civil Enforcement of Congressional
Authorities: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intell. Prop., and the Internet of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 117th Cong., YOUTUBE (June 8, 2021), https://youtu.be/XDlf4-k2bqs
[https://perma.cc/AF4Y-V7WS] (“No, I don’t think the report supports that proposition. Congress’
position has long been that it is not bound by common law privileges. Instead, Congress has said that
it’s at the discretion of the committee chair as to whether or not to accept that type of a privilege, and in
fact there are multiple House committees who have that specifically in their committee rules. So, I think
that line in Mazars is an odd one, and it’s one that’s been subject to a lot of criticism.”).
116. When asked if the Chief Justice’s dictum squared with her experience, Elise Bean, a former
Staff Director and Chief Counsel with the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations under
Chairman Carl Levin, testified: “It does not. For my entire 30 years, my understanding was that the
Congress is not bound by common law privileges.” Similarly, Thomas G. Hungar, former General
Counsel of the House of Representatives and former Deputy Solicitor General at the Department of
Justice, testified: “It certainly was always the position of the General Counsel’s office at the House, and
I’m sure still is, that the House is not obligated to recognize common law privileges.” Civil Enforcement
of Congressional Authorities: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intell. Prop., and the Internet
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 117th Cong., YOUTUBE (June 8, 2021), https://youtu.be/XDlf4-k2bqs
[https://perma.cc/AF4Y-V7WS].
117. See, e.g., MORTON ROSENBERG, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL95464, INVESTIGATIVE OVERSIGHT:
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY 32 (1995)
(“The precedents of the Senate and the House of Representatives, which are founded on Congress’
inherent constitutional prerogative to investigate, establish that the acceptance of a claim of attorneyclient or work product privilege rests in the sound discretion of a congressional committee regardless of
whether a court would uphold the claim in the context of litigation.”); MORTON ROSENBERG & TODD B.
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like the Congressional Oversight Manual, also painstakingly compile
numerous examples of committees exercising their own authority to rule on
assertions of the attorney-client privilege.
2. Recent Oversight Committee Case Studies
When committees decide to obtain attorney-client information, they do
so to serve a wide array of purposes under the Constitution. Informing
legislation on a topic being examined is one of the most common goals, but
committees also obtain attorney-client information to oversee the
expenditure of taxpayer funds, modify how the privilege applies in other
branches, and examine executive branch actions that serve improper
purposes. Summarized below are examples of all four purposes drawn from
my former committee, the House Committee on Oversight and Reform.118
They are not exhaustive, and they do not represent all of the constitutional
purposes for which Congress may seek attorney-client information, but they
illustrate how Democratic and Republican chairs alike have been obtaining
attorney-client communications for decades to fulfill their constitutional
responsibilities.
The first case demonstrates how an investigation helps inform
legislation. In 2007, the Committee launched an investigation into one of
the most searing incidents of the Iraq War, the brutal killing of four
Blackwater USA private security contractors in Fallujah in 2004 after the
company failed to provide them with sufficient protective equipment and
other critical resources.119 When Blackwater asserted the attorney-client
privilege over several documents, Chairman Henry Waxman sent a letter
informing the company that the attorney-client privilege is not a valid basis

TATELMAN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL34097, CONGRESS’S CONTEMPT POWER: LAW, HISTORY,
PRACTICE, AND PROCEDURE 56 (2007) (“[I]t is the congressional committee alone that determines
whether to accept a claim of attorney-client privilege.”); BARBARA L. SCHWEMLE, TODD GARVEY,
VIVIAN S. CHU & HENRY B. HOGUE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R40856, THE DEBATE OVER SELECTED
PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANTS AND ADVISORS: APPOINTMENT, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND CONGRESSIONAL
OVERSIGHT 32 (2014) (“[A]s with other claims of ‘common law’ privileges such as the attorney-client
privilege . . . congressional practice has been to treat their acceptance as discretionary with the committee
of jurisdiction.”); TODD GARVEY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL34097, CONGRESS’S CONTEMPT POWER AND
THE ENFORCEMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL SUBPOENAS: LAW, HISTORY, PRACTICE, AND PROCEDURE 61,
63 (2017) (“[R]ecognition of non-constitutionally based privileges, such as attorney-client privilege, is
a matter of congressional discretion.”).
118. The committee’s name has changed over time from the Committee on Government Reform
to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform to the Committee on Oversight and Reform.
119. Iraq Reconstruction: Reliance on Private Military Contractors and Status Report: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. (2007) (family members testifying);
Blackwater USA: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. (2007)
(CEO Erik Prince testifying).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4254169

2022

HOUSE RULES

477

to withhold documents from the Committee.120 He directed Blackwater to
produce documents from the company’s privilege log that were relevant to
the Committee’s ongoing oversight of private security contractors in Iraq,
and he made clear that one of the Committee’s goals was to inform
“potential legislative action to improve oversight and accountability over
private military contractors.”121 When Blackwater again refused, the
Committee issued a subpoena and threatened to hold Blackwater in
contempt.122 Blackwater ultimately gave the Committee access to the
documents, and the Committee issued a report on its investigation.123
Congress subsequently adopted several legislative reforms setting forth new
requirements for private security contractors in areas of combat
operations.124
The second case involves Congress’s efforts to prevent the misuse of
taxpayer funds. In the following Congress, the Committee investigated one
of the watershed scandals of the financial crisis of 2008: a secret infusion of
$20 billion in taxpayer funds for Bank of America’s acquisition of the
troubled financial services firm Merrill Lynch.125 Although the Bank’s
CEO, Ken Lewis, testified that Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson and
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke pressured the Bank to acquire
Merrill Lynch despite its unexpected and growing losses, the Committee
obtained evidence that the Bank was threatening to back out of the merger
as leverage to obtain federal funds.126 The Committee’s new Chairman, Rep.
Edolphus Towns, sought a wide range of attorney-client information to
investigate these claims.127 The Bank’s counsel argued that these documents

120. Letter from Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, to Erik
Prince, Chairman, Blackwater USA (May 7, 2007) (attorney-client privilege “not a valid basis for
withholding information that Congress needs to fulfill its oversight responsibilities”).
121. Id.
122. H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, Subpoena of Erik Prince (Aug. 3, 2007).
123. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, 110TH CONG., REP. ON PRIVATE
MILITARY CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ: AN EXAMINATION OF BLACKWATER’S ACTIONS IN FALLUJAH 16–
17 (Comm. Print 2007).
124. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. 110-181, § 862, 122 Stat.
3, 254–258.
125. See, e.g., Letter from Edolphus Towns, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform,
& Dennis Kucinich, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Domestic Pol’y, to Kenneth D. Lewis, Chief Exec.
Officer & President, Bank of Am. Corp. (June 3, 2009).
126. Bank of America and Merrill Lynch: How Did a Private Deal Turn Into a Federal Bailout?:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform & Subcomm. on Domestic Pol’y, 111th
Cong. 2 (2009) (statement of Chairman Towns) (noting email indicating that Bernanke thought Lewis
was using the Merrill losses as a “bargaining chip” to obtain federal funds and concluding: “[T]he
Treasury Department had provided $20 billion for a shotgun wedding. But the question may be, who
was holding the shotgun?”).
127. See, e.g., Letter from Edolphus Towns, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform,
to Kenneth D. Lewis, Chief Exec. Officer & President, Bank of Am. Corp. (Aug. 6, 2009) (seeking
records of “legal advice that was provided to you or any Bank of America employee . . . related to
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would be covered by the common law attorney-client privilege in court, but
he acknowledged that it was up to the Committee to decide in this
proceeding.128 Since one of the company’s primary concerns was that
producing the documents to the Committee could result in a general waiver
of the privilege in other proceedings, the Bank asked the Committee to
withdraw its demand.129 In response, Chairman Towns considered the
Bank’s request and recognized the interests served by the privilege, but
ultimately denied the request, explaining that the documents “go to the heart
of the issues most critical to our investigation.”130 The Bank submitted a
privilege log, engaged in negotiations, and eventually produced privileged
documents and testimony, including notes from attorneys that were used at
subsequent hearings to help develop the Committee’s findings.131 The
Bank’s CEO resigned in 2009,132 and the company paid back hundreds of
millions of dollars to the Treasury.133
A third case illustrates how Congress uses its investigative authority to
alter the attorney-client privilege itself. From 2015 to 2018, the Committee
conducted a bipartisan investigation into serious aviation security
disclosure of the financial condition of Merrill Lynch or to the disclosure of any U.S. government
financial assistance to Bank of America”).
128. Letter from Reginald J. Brown, Russell J. Bruemmer & Laura Moranchek Hussain, Couns.
to Bank of America, to Edolphus Towns, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform (Sept. 9,
2009) (acknowledging “the right of each chamber to make its own independent determination as to
whether to recognize the attorney‐client privilege”).
129. Id. at 2–3; see also Louise Story, Congress Presses for Details from Bank of America on
Talks, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/21/business/21bank.htm
[https://perma.cc/XJ6H-8TZB].
130. Letter from Edolphus Towns, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, to
Kenneth D. Lewis, Chief Exec. Officer & President, Bank of Am. Corp. (Sept. 18, 2009).
131. Bank of America and Merrill Lynch: How Did a Private Deal Turn Into a Federal Bailout?
Part IV: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform & Subcomm. on Domestic Pol’y,
111th Cong. (2009). See also Sue Reisinger, What Was BofA Lawyer’s Advice on Merrill? It Depended
on the Audience, CC CORP. COUNS. (Oct. 26, 2009) (indicating that attorneys were telling the Bank’s
leadership “one story about how difficult it would be to escape from the merger with Merrill Lynch &
Co., Inc., while singing quite a different tune to the federal government,” according to “documents
released this week from the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform”); Zach Lowe,
Wachtell
Under
Fire,
AMLAW
DAILY
(Oct.
23,
2009,
5:56
PM),
https://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2009/10/wachtell-under-fire.html
[https://perma.cc/LS8V-MRGC] (reviewing how “piles and piles of formerly privileged documents
related to the Bank of America-Merrill Lynch merger” indicated that “BofA attempted to leverage a
threat to break the deal into billions in government bailout aid”); D. Jean Veta & Brian D. Smith,
Congressional Investigations: Bank of America and Recent Developments in Attorney-Client Privilege,
BLOOMBERG L. REPS. 1 (2010), (“The dispute concluded with Bank of America delivering to Congress
a substantial quantity of privileged documents and with Bank of America’s former general counsel
testifying publicly about the legal advice that he and others provided to the company.”).
132. Dan Fitzpatrick & Joann S. Lublin, Bank of America Chief Resigns Under Fire, WALL ST.
J. (Oct.
2,
2009,
12:01
AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB125434715693053835
[https://perma.cc/5ZK3-4ZLB] (including $424 million relating to “financial guarantees against
potential losses associated with Merrill Lynch’s toxic assets, such as mortgage-backed securities”).
133. H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMITTEE ON
OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, H.R. REP. NO. 111-705, at 17–20 (2011).
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vulnerabilities and allegations of retaliation by managers against
whistleblowers at the Transportation Security Administration (TSA).134 The
Committee issued a subpoena after TSA declined to produce attorney-client
information to the Committee and to the Office of Special Counsel (OSC),
an independent agency charged with protecting whistleblowers.135 The new
Republican Chairman, Rep. Jason Chaffetz, and the Democratic Ranking
Member, Rep. Elijah E. Cummings, sent a joint letter to TSA setting forth
Congress’s longstanding position on assertions of the common law
attorney-client privilege.136 Again, one of the agency’s primary concerns
was that producing attorney-client communications would risk a general
waiver of the privilege in separate litigation.137 In its reply, the Committee
explained that complying with a mandatory demand from Congress does
not constitute a general waiver in other proceedings.138 Ultimately, TSA
provided the Committee with full access to the documents through in
camera review.139 After the review was complete, Chairman Chaffetz
released findings that TSA’s redactions had been inappropriate.140 Congress
subsequently passed legislation amending OSC’s authorizing statute to
make clear that agencies may not assert any common law privilege,
including the attorney-client privilege, to withhold information from
OSC.141 In its own report on the bill, the Senate Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Committee confirmed that no federal agency may
withhold information from OSC on the basis of any common law

134. See, e.g., Examining Misconduct and Retaliation at TSA: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 115th Cong. (2018).
135. H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, Subpoena to Acting Adm’r Huban A.
Gowadia, Ph.D., Transp. Sec. Admin. (Mar. 17, 2017).
136. Letter from Jason Chaffetz, Chairman, and Elijah E. Cummings, Ranking Member, H.
Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, to Huban A. Gowadia, Ph.D., Acting Adm’r, Transp. Sec.
Admin., 1 (May 2, 2017).
137. Letter from Joseph B. Maher, Acting Gen. Couns., Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Jason
Chaffetz, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 1 (Mar. 10, 2017).
138. Letter from Jason Chaffetz, supra note 136, at 2 (“[I]t is well established that production of
materials to Congress is not deemed a disclosure to the public, nor is a compelled production considered
a voluntary production for the purpose of waiver.”) (citations omitted).
139. Letter from Benjamin L. Cassidy, Assistant Sec’y for Legis. Affs., Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform (Feb. 5, 2018).
140. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, 115TH CONG., REP. ON
MISCONDUCT, RETALIATION, AND OBSTRUCTION AT THE TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN. (Comm. Print 2018).
141. On December 12, 2017, the President signed H.R. 2810, the National Defense Authorization
Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2018, Public Law 115–91 (Dec. 12, 2017), which included legislation
previously passed by the House and Senate to reauthorize OSC. See, e.g., Office of Special Counsel
Reauthorization Act of 2017, S.582, 115th Cong. (as passed by Senate on August 1, 2017); The
Thoroughly Investigating Retaliation Against Whistleblowers Act, H.R. 69, 115th Cong. (as passed by
House on Jan. 4, 2017). Section 1097(a) of the NDAA amended 5 U.S.C. § 1212(b)(5) to provide that a
“claim of common law privilege by an agency, or an officer or employee of an agency, shall not prevent
the Special Counsel from obtaining any material” relating to an OSC investigation, review, or inquiry.
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privilege.142 By February of the following year, TSA had reported that it
provided OSC unredacted copies of the documents.143 By May, OSC had
obtained settlements with three TSA employees whose cases related to the
documents that had been withheld.144
The fourth example demonstrates how the Committee helped expose the
executive branch’s attempt to add a citizenship question to the 2020 Census
based on secret, illegitimate purposes. Congress’s role in implementing the
Census is enshrined in the Constitution,145 and the House has used its Article
I rulemaking authority to grant jurisdiction over the Census to the
Committee on Oversight and Reform.146 When Commerce Secretary Wilbur
Ross announced that he was adding a citizenship question to the Census,
career experts warned that this sudden change would discourage
participation and degrade the quality of the enumeration.147 Ross testified
that he added the citizenship question solely in response to a request from
the Justice Department to gather data to help enforce the Voting Rights
Act.148 However, the Committee obtained evidence that this claim was a
pretext, that White House and other Administration officials began
discussing the citizenship question within days of taking office, and that
their actual goals were to exclude immigrants from the count and implement
partisan gerrymandering.149 When then-Chairman Elijah Cummings issued
subpoenas to the Departments of Justice and Commerce, they invoked the
attorney-client privilege to withhold documents, including several legal

142. S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. AND GOV’TL AFFS., OFFICE OF SPECIAL COUNSEL
REAUTHORIZATION ACT, S. REP. NO. 115-74, at 7 (2017).
143. Letter from Benjamin L. Cassidy, supra note 139.
144. Press Release, Off. of Spec. Couns., OSC Obtains Settlements for TSA Whistleblowers in
Three Involuntary Reassignment Cases (May 23, 2018).
145. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (authorizing Congress to carry out the census in “such manner
as they shall by law direct”).
146. Rules of the House of Representatives, R. X, cl. (1)(n)(8), H.R. Doc. No. 116-177, 117th
Cong. (2021).
147. See, e.g., Memorandum from John M. Abowd, Chief Scientist & Assoc. Dir. for Rsch.
Methodology, Census Bureau, to Wilbur L. Ross. Jr., Sec’y, Dep’t of Com. (Jan. 19, 2018).
148. FY19 Budget: Dep’t of Com.: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Com., Just., Sci., and Related
Agencies of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 115th Cong. (2018); Hearing with Com. Sec’y Ross:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 115th Cong. (2018); Progress Report on the 2020
Census: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 115th Cong. (2018); FY 2019
Funding Request for the Comm. Dep’: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Com., Just., Sci., and Related
Agencies of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 115th Cong. (2018).
149. See Letter from Elijah E. Cummings, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform, to
Wilbur L. Ross, Jr., Sec’y, Dep’t of Com. (June 3, 2019) (quoting Thomas Hofeller, The Use of Citizen
Voting Age Population in Redistricting (2015) (contending that counting voting-age citizens, rather than
total population, “would be advantageous to Republicans and Non-Hispanic Whites”)); see also Michael
Wines, Deceased G.O.P. Strategist’s Hard Drives Reveal New Details on the Census Citizenship
Question, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/30/us/census-citizenshipquestion-hofeller.html [https://perma.cc/WHN7-7SYX].
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memoranda relating to the decision to add the citizenship question.150 The
Committee rejected this assertion on a bipartisan basis, holding Ross and
Attorney General William Barr in contempt.151 At the Attorney General’s
recommendation, President Trump responded by making a blanket
“protective assertion” of executive privilege over all of the documents.152
After the Committee’s contempt vote, the Supreme Court ruled in a separate
case brought by the State of New York and others that the Trump
Administration’s sole reason for adding the citizenship question was
“contrived.”153 Within a month of the decision, the full House voted to hold
Ross and Barr in contempt,154 and the D.C. District Court judge hearing the
case indicated that he was inclined to uphold the Committee’s subpoenas.155
After additional negotiations, a stay to await an appellate ruling in a separate
case, and a change in leadership, the Committee obtained access to the
subpoenaed documents, including all those over which the attorney-client
privilege had been claimed.156
These four relatively recent examples of this longstanding congressional
practice—under four different Chairs of both political parties—demonstrate
that evaluating the actions of private sector and government attorneys is
150. Letter from Stephen E. Boyd. Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Just., to Elijah E. Cummings,
Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform (June 12, 2019); Letter from Charles Kolo Rathburn,
Performing the Duties of the Assistant Sec’y for Legis. & Intergovernmental Affs., Dep’t of Com., to
Elijah E. Cummings, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform (June 6, 2019).
151. H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & REFORM, RESOLUTION RECOMMENDING THAT THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES FIND WILLIAM P. BARR, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, AND WILBUR
L. ROSS, JR., SECRETARY OF COMMERCE, IN CONTEMPT OF CONGRESS FOR REFUSAL TO COMPLY WITH
SUBPOENAS DULY ISSUED BY THE COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT & REFORM, H.R. REP. NO. 116-125, 31
(2019) (“[T]he common law privileges cited by the Trump Administration are not valid reasons to
withhold documents subject to a valid subpoena from Congress, which derives its investigative authority
from the Constitution.”).
152. Id. at 26–27; Letter from William P. Barr, Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Just., to Donald Trump,
President of the U.S. 6 (June 11, 2019).
153. Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2575 (2019) (“Altogether, the evidence tells a
story that does not match the explanation the Secretary gave for his decision.”).
154. H.R. Res. 497, 116th Cong. (July 17, 2019).
155. See Spencer S. Hsu, Judge Says He Will Likely Uphold House Subpoenas in Investigation of
Census Citizenship Question, WASH. POST (Jan. 30, 2020, 7:11 PM) (quoting U.S. District Judge
Randolph D. Moss as saying, “I think everyone in this room can see where I’m going”),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/legal-issues/us-judge-says-he-will-likely-uphold-housesubpoenas-in-investigation-of-census-citizenship-question/2020/01/30/ee688668-4394-11ea-b5fceefa848cde99_story.html [https://perma.cc/BMB9-3AHZ].
156. Memorandum from Rep. Carolyn B. Maloney, Chairwoman, to Members of the H. Comm.
on Oversight & Reform, Investigation of Census Citizenship Question 3 (July 20, 2022) (noting key
legal documents ultimately obtained by the Committee over which the Trump Administration had made
“inappropriate and overbroad assertions of attorney-client privilege and deliberative process privilege”).
The Committee’s civil contempt suit was stayed pending the D.C. Circuit Court’s disposition of Comm.
on the Judiciary v. McGahn, 968 F.3d 755 (D.C. Cir. 2020). See Comm. on Oversight & Reform v. Barr,
No. 1:19-cv-03557 (D.D.C. Oct. 6, 2020) (Minute Order). After the Justice Department produced the
Census-related documents, the parties jointly dismissed the case. Comm. on Oversight & Reform v.
Barr, No. 1:19-cv-3557 (Jan. 7, 2022), Dkt. No. 63–64 (Joint Status Report and Stipulation of Dismissal).
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often key to investigations that are critical to informing Congress’s
legitimate constitutional objectives and serving the nation’s interests.
Requiring committees to apply the common law attorney-client privilege in
all cases would degrade their ability to fulfill their constitutional
responsibilities. Not only would it curtail the information Congress is able
to obtain, but it would significantly impair Congress’s efforts to negotiate
accommodations with witnesses—a goal the Supreme Court has repeatedly
extolled.157 Witnesses would have little incentive to negotiate, submit
privilege logs, or provide in camera viewings as they did in these cases, but
instead could simply walk away from the negotiating table and begin
litigating every claim of attorney-client privilege, no matter how broad or
unfounded.158
C. Judicial Precedents
There is no judicial precedent indicating that the attorney-client privilege
has a constitutional basis.159 The attorney-client privilege is not explicitly
referenced in the Constitution or the Bill of Rights. In Mazars, Chief Justice
Roberts referred to it as a common law privilege and cited no judicial rulings
requiring committees to recognize it.160 For attorneys who practice in
federal courts, where the privilege is lauded as one of the oldest testimonial
privileges under common law, the assertion that Congress is under no legal
obligation to recognize the privilege may seem surprising.161 But as
discussed above, there are many significant differences for lawyers
representing clients before Congress, including their inability to make
statements or motions, present or review evidence, or call or cross-examine
witnesses.162

157. See Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2031 (citing NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573
U.S. 513, 524–26 (2014)).
158. Ross, supra note 6, at 130 (“There have been a number of instances where people have
claimed privilege where there was not an establishment of an attorney-client relationship. There have
been a number of instances where people have claimed privilege where the public record was replete
with evidence of waiver of any privilege that might exist. There are a number of instances where people
have claimed privilege where the services performed by the attorney were not the rendering of
confidential legal advice, which is a predicate to the assertion of the privilege.”).
159. Clutchette v. Rushen, 770 F.2d 1469, 1471 (9th. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1088
(1986) (noting that “the attorney-client privilege is merely a rule of evidence” and has not been “held a
constitutional right”).
160. Mazars, 140 S. Ct. at 2032 (citing only 2003 CRS REPORT, supra note 5).
161. See, e.g., Beard, supra note 71, at 120 (“Most clients, and probably many lawyers, assume
that the attorney-client privilege protects their confidential communications against disclosure in any
legal proceeding,” but “congressional witnesses are not legally entitled to the protection of the attorneyclient privilege,” and “committees therefore have discretionary authority to respect or overrule such
claims as they see fit.”).
162. See infra Part I.A.
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Instead, the consensus has always been that the attorney-client privilege
was developed by federal judges based on the common law, as the Supreme
Court observed in its seminal case on this issue, Upjohn Co. v. United
States.163 In that case, the Court used the authority granted by Congress in
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 to expand the application of attorney-client
privilege in certain corporate contexts.164 The Court explained that the
purpose of the privilege is to serve a policy goal rather than a constitutional
one, which is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys
and their clients to promote broad “public interests” in the administration of
justice.165
Historically, federal courts have been extremely reticent to impose their
own judicially developed procedures onto Congress—except to preserve
applicable constitutional protections. In one of the earliest cases on this
issue, United States v. Ballin, the Supreme Court refused to examine the
wisdom of the process established by the House to determine the existence
of a quorum.166 After highlighting each chamber’s Article I authority to
determine the rules of its proceedings, the Court held that the appropriate
role of federal courts is to determine the constitutional validity of the
process.167 The Court noted that the Constitution authorizes both the House
and Senate to change their rules in different circumstances, and—except in
cases of constitutional limitations—that power is “absolute and beyond the
challenge of any other body or tribunal.”168
The Supreme Court reaffirmed these principles forty years later in
United States v. Smith, but with a different result. In that case, the Senate
had voted in favor of a presidential nominee to the Federal Power
Commission and immediately sent the confirmation resolution to the
President, but after the President commissioned the nominee to the position,
163. Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (“The attorney-client privilege is the
oldest of the privileges for confidential communications known to the common law.”); see also 8 JOHN
HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE: EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2292, at 554
(McNaughton rev. 1961) (“(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal
advisor in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence
(5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the
legal advisor, (8) except the protection can be waived.”).
164. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389, 392 (expanding the privilege in corporate contexts in light of the
“vast and complicated array of regulatory legislation confronting the modern corporation”).
165. Id.
166. United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892).
167. Id. at 4–5 (“The question, therefore, is as to the validity of this rule, and not what methods
the Speaker may of his own motion resort to for determining the presence of a quorum, nor what matters
the Speaker or clerk may of their own volition place upon the journal. Neither do the advantages or
disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of such a rule present any matters for judicial consideration . . . .
But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the house, and it is
no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more accurate or even more
just.”).
168. Id.
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the Senate reconsidered the nomination and voted a second time to reject
it.169 As in Ballin, the Court cited Congress’s constitutional rulemaking
authority170 and explained that the role of federal courts is to examine the
constitutional validity of the process.171 After reviewing the Senate’s rule
on reconsidering presidential appointments, however, the Court found that
the rule envisioned the Senate withholding the notification to the President
until the time for motions to reconsider had expired, and when the Senate
sent the notification to the President without waiting for reconsideration, it
authorized the President to “perfect the appointment.”172
In some cases, witnesses may seek injunctive relief from federal courts
to block compliance with congressional subpoenas without waiting to be
held in contempt, and in these cases, Congress has successfully invoked the
Speech and Debate Clause to safeguard its authorities and procedures. For
example, in Eastland v. United States Servicemen’s Fund, Chief Justice
Warren Burger found that a Senate subcommittee subpoena for bank records
furthered a legitimate task of Congress and was properly authorized by the
Senate.173 The Court held that once these constitutional requirements were
met, committee members could not be questioned in any other place,
including in federal court, and the Speech and Debate Clause provides an
“absolute bar” to injunctive relief.174 The Court refused to look to the
motives that prompted the investigation,175 warning that the wisdom of
congressional approach or methodology is “not open to judicial veto.”176
The Court also cautioned against the harm that judicial interference may
cause to Congress’s constitutional responsibilities.177
In the wake of Eastland, several district courts refused to interfere with
Congress’s right to decide claims of attorney-client privilege. In 1977—just
two years after Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence—the
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on
169. United States v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6, 27–29 (1932).
170. Id. at 33.
171. Id. at 48 (“The Constitution commits to the Senate the power to make its own rules; and it is
not the function of the Court to say that another rule would be better.”).
172. Id. at 49; see also Vander Jagt v. O’Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“Because
of the position taken in Ballin, which apparently was adopted by Justice Brandeis writing for the
Supreme Court in United States v. Smith . . . we conclude that Art. I simply means that neither we nor
the Executive Branch may tell Congress what rules it must adopt.”); NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S.
513, 550–51 (2014) (holding that, for purposes of the Recess Appointments Clause, “the Senate is in
session when it says it is,” provided that it retains the ability to transact business under its own rules).
173. 421 U.S. 491, 505–506 (1975).
174. Id. at 503 (quoting Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 314 (1973)).
175. Id. at 508 (citing Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 200 (1957); Hutcheson v. United
States, 369 U.S. 599, 614 (1962)).
176. Id. at 509 (citing Doe, 412 U.S. at 313).
177. Id. at 511 (“A legislative inquiry has been frustrated for nearly five years, during which the
Members and their aide have been obliged to devote time to consultation with their counsel concerning
the litigation, and have been distracted from the purpose of their inquiry.”).
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Interstate and Foreign Commerce was faced with a claim of attorney-client
privilege over documents subpoenaed in an investigation of alleged
international uranium price-fixing.178 In that case, Gulf Oil sought an
injunction in D.C. district court to prevent Westinghouse Electric Corp.
from producing attorney-client communications.179 Rep. Henry Waxman,
serving as acting chair, cited the witnesses for contempt, referring directly
to the holding in Eastland.180
The district court agreed with Waxman.181 The court examined the
constitutional questions of whether the House had properly authorized the
investigation and whether the subpoena was issued for a valid legislative
inquiry, finding that both requirements were met.182 Then, citing Eastland,
the court declined to examine the question of whether the common law
attorney-client privilege applied because it concluded that it was a matter
for the committee to decide and not a federal court.183 After the
Subcommittee obtained the documents, Chairman John Moss agreed to hear
Gulf’s request to recognize the privilege and withhold documents from the
public184 even as Gulf’s counsel conceded that the Subcommittee had
ultimate discretion to overcome the privilege.185 After consulting with
congressional legal counsel,186 the Subcommittee adopted a unanimous
resolution rejecting Gulf’s claim of attorney-client privilege.187
In another case, the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
examined private health insurance companies accused of abusing the
Medicare Secondary Payer program, which requires insurance companies
178. Int’l Uranium Cartel, supra note 72.
179. Id. at 46.
180. Id. at 38 (citing Eastland, 421 U.S. at 491).
181. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 434 F. Supp. 773 (D.D.C. 1977).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 774 (finding that “Gulf claimed attorney-client and other asserted privileges,” that
“defendant Westinghouse was served with a valid subpoena . . . pursuant to a properly authorized
investigation, that the Subcommittee had a valid investigative purpose, [and] that under the case of
Eastland v. United States Servicemen’s Fund . . . , the Subcommittee action may not be questioned in
any other place”).
184. Letter from John E. Moss, Chairman, Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations, Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Com., to Richard T. Colman, Couns. for Gulf Oil (May 23, 1977), as reprinted in
Int’l Uranium Cartel, supra note 72, at 90–91 (noting that “Members of the House of Representatives
are in no way constrained to honor the attorney-client and related privileges, or even to entertain their
claim”).
185. Int’l Uranium Cartel, supra note 72, at 49 (statement of Richard T. Colman, Counsel for
Gulf Oil) (“[W]e recognize the position of the chairman and the committee that we are not entitled as a
matter of right to privilege.”).
186. Id. at 62.
187. Id. at 123–28 (“[T]he power of the Congress to inquire is sufficiently broad to encompass the
entirety of the body of law, either the statutory law, the constitutional law, or the common law under
which we act. It is my firm conviction that the commonwealth precedents, customs of both the Commons
and the House, fully sustain rejecting a claim of attorney-client privilege if it impedes in any manner
whatsoever the necessary inquiries of the Congress in determining whether a law of the United States
may have been violated or whether that law accords sufficient protection to the American people.”).
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to be the primary payer for people over sixty-five who are still employed
and have insurance through their employers.188 The Subcommittee’s
chairman, Senator Sam Nunn, sought information from an employee of
Provident Life and Accident Insurance Company who had written a memo
indicating that Provident knew its failure to process claims as the primary
payer was illegal.189 The company sought a preliminary injunction in federal
court based on the attorney-client privilege to prevent the employee from
producing records or testifying before the Subcommittee.190 The company
filed its motion in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Tennessee because that court had ruled in separate litigation that the
memo was covered by the privilege in that litigation.191 The district court
rejected Provident’s motion, finding that it was premature since the
Subcommittee itself had not yet ruled on the privilege claim.192 The court
also noted that even if the case had been properly brought, the court would
not have granted the motion because federal courts should not make
determinations on evidentiary privileges that are not derived from the
Constitution.193 With respect to its previous ruling on the attorney-client
privilege claim in the separate litigation, the court stated: “That ruling,
which is not of constitutional dimensions, is certainly not binding on the
Congress of the United States.”194
After the court issued its opinion, Chairman Nunn allowed Provident to
make its case in executive session about why the document should be
withheld,195 but he ultimately ruled that the attorney-client privilege did not
apply.196 The Subcommittee obtained the withheld document, deposed the
188. Healthcare Fraud/Medicare Secondary Payer Program: Hearing Before the Permanent
Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Gov’tl Affs., 101st Cong. 2 (1990).
189. Id. at 235, Exhibit P, Memorandum from Marilyn Shelley to Dana Reynolds (Mar. 5, 1985)
(concluding that it was a “violation of federal law when we pay as a secondary carrier”).
190. In re Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., No. CIV-1-90-219, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21067
(E.D. Tenn. June 13, 1990).
191. Id. at *6.
192. Id.
193. Id. (“Congress, as represented in this case by the Senate Subcommittee, stands as a separate
and co-equal branch of government which is capable of making its own determinations regarding
privileges asserted by witnesses before it. This Court’s ruling that a portion of the March 5, 1985 Shelley
memorandum is subject to the attorney-client privilege was an evidentiary ruling applying only in the
case before this Court in which it was made.”).
194. Id. at *6–7.
195. Healthcare Fraud/Medicare Secondary Payer Program, supra note 188, at 4, Exhibit JJ,
Attorney-Client Privilege Exhibit (“The attorney-client privilege is a common law rule of evidence
which protects certain confidential communications between a client and a lawyer from compelled
disclosure. Congress has in the past often been willing to recognize valid assertions of the privilege—
this Subcommittee also . . . . The burden is then, as I see it, on you as the party claiming the privilege to
demonstrate that the privilege exists and to tell us why. I will hear from you about whatever you would
like to tell us concerning why this is privileged and then I will make a determination on that question.”).
196. Id. (explaining that Provident waived privilege through separate production to Justice
Department).
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Provident employee, and held a hearing with the company’s CEO, during
which he was asked repeatedly about the document.197 The Subcommittee
included in its official hearing record an “Attorney-Client Privilege Exhibit”
which cited the district court’s observation that non-constitutional privilege
determinations by federal courts are not binding on Congress.198 Chairman
Nunn succinctly explained his authority to rule on behalf of the
Subcommittee: “The court has made a ruling governing its proceedings and,
as the Chairman of the Subcommittee, I will make a ruling governing these
proceedings.”199
Although federal courts historically have declined to interfere with
Congress’s constitutional authority to make its own determinations on
claims of attorney-client privilege, courts have decided subsequent cases
brought by third parties to examine whether witnesses may have waived the
privilege by producing records or testimony to Congress voluntarily. Many
of these waiver cases arose in the 1990s when the House Commerce
Committee under Chairman Thomas Bliley subpoenaed and obtained
attorney-client records from tobacco companies, after which various
plaintiffs in separate litigation sought discovery of the documents.200 These
waiver cases generally found that to preserve the privilege in subsequent
litigation, parties must demonstrate that their compliance with
congressional subpoenas was not voluntary, and they must go beyond
merely noting their concerns in a letter.201 Instead, they must demonstrate
that they took all appropriate steps to contest the subpoena, raise objections,
and negotiate with the committee to avoid the production.202
197. Id. at 41–45.
198. Id. at 3–4.
199. Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
200. See Don. R. Berthiaume & Jeffrey J. Ansley, Where Did My Privilege Go? Congress and Its
Discretion to Ignore the Attorney-Client Privilege, 47 CRIM. L. BULL. 210 (2011) (describing House
Commerce Committee investigation and subsequent litigation on waiver issue).
201. See, e.g., Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local No. 132, Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip
Morris, Inc., No. CIV.A 3:97-0708, 1999 WL 33659387 (S.D. W. Va., June 28, 1999) (alteration in
original) (compelled production of privileged documents does not waive privilege when witness “objects
and take[s] reasonable steps to protect its claims of privilege and protection”); Iron Workers Local No.
17 Ins. Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 582, 595 (N.D. Ohio, 1999) (company waived
attorney-client privilege when it produced subpoenaed documents with “no real effort by defendants to
challenge the order,” “no effort by the tobacco defendants to meet with Chairman Bliley or other
members of the Committee,” no “legal memorandum setting forth the bases for the privilege with the
committee or statement to the committee of the factual bases for the privileges,” and “no submission of
a privilege log”); United States v. Philip Morris Inc., 212 F.R.D. 421, 425 (D.D.C. 2002) (“Although
there is no checklist of procedural steps that automatically guarantees preservation of the privilege, in
this instance Defendants’ limited efforts to preserve the privilege prior to production were clearly
insufficient.”).
202. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Philip Morris Inc., No. 957378J, 1998 WL 1248003, at *6
(Mass. July 30, 1998) (“In order to preserve any privilege, the subpoenaed witness must take all steps
reasonably available to contest that subpoena, and only if those steps are unsuccessful will testimony or
document production in compliance with the subpoena be treated as a compulsory disclosure.”).
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Dovetailing with this approach, the D.C. Bar issued an opinion in 1999
making clear that although attorneys have a responsibility to safeguard
client confidences,203 they do not violate ethics rules by producing
privileged documents once a committee has issued a subpoena, which
carries the force of law similar to a court order, and has threatened
contempt.204 A brief summary of the investigation that led to this ethics
opinion helps illustrate the point. In 1998, a subcommittee of the House
Commerce Committee was examining allegations of illegal influence in the
construction of a $400 million building for the Federal Communications
Commission.205 As part of that investigation, Chairman Bliley issued four
subpoenas to the developer, Franklin L. Haney, and three companies under
his control.206 When Haney asserted the attorney-client privilege, the
subcommittee held him in contempt.207 The full Committee then held its
own meeting, confirmed the subcommittee’s action, and also voted to hold
Haney in contempt.208 After that vote, Haney’s attorneys asked whether the
Committee would rescind the contempt finding if the documents were
produced, and the Committee confirmed that it would.209 The Committee
took the rescission vote, and Haney’s attorneys produced the documents.210
The following year, the D.C. Bar’s Ethics Committee issued its opinion
advising that while attorneys must protect attorney-client information, they
may produce it to Congress after raising all available, legitimate objections
and engaging in negotiations to modify or withdraw the subpoena.211 The
opinion recognized that these negotiations may bear no fruit and that a

203. See, e.g., D.C. BAR, RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT, R. 1.6(a)(1) (prohibiting a lawyer from
knowingly revealing a client’s confidence or secret); id. R. 1.6(e)(2)(A) (allowing disclosure when
required by law or court order).
204. D.C. Bar, Legal Ethics Comm., Opinion No. 288, Compliance with Subpoena from
Congressional Committee to Produce Lawyers’ Files Containing Client Confidences or Secrets (Feb.
16, 1999) (“A directive of a Congressional subcommittee accompanied by a threat of fines and
imprisonment pursuant to federal criminal law satisfies the standard of ‘required by law’ as that phrase
is used in D.C. Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6(d)(2)(A).”).
205. H. COMM. ON COM., CONTEMPT OF CONGRESS AGAINST FRANKLIN L. HANEY, H.R. REP.
NO. 105-792, at 1 (1998).
206. Id. at 1, 7 (including Tower Associates II, Inc., the Franklin L. Haney Company, and Building
Finance Company of Tennessee).
207. Id. at 2.
208. Id. at III.
209. H. Comm. on Com., Meeting on Portals Investigation (Authorization of Subpoenas; Receipt
of Subpoenaed Docs. and Consideration of Objections; and Contempt of Congress Proceedings Against
Franklin L. Haney), 105th Cong. 101–05 (Comm. Print. 1998); see also ROSENBERG, supra note 111, at
69 n.28; ROSENBERG & TATELMAN, supra note 117, at 55–56.
210. H.R. REP. NO. 105-792, at III.
211. D.C. Bar, supra note 204. Haney had sought the opinion before producing the privileged
documents, but the ethics committee informed him it would not be able to provide advice until after it
considered the matter further. Meeting on Portals Investigation, supra note 209, at 48–50. See also
ROSENBERG, supra note 111, at 69 n.28; ROSENBERG & TATELMAN, supra note 117, at 55.
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committee might demand production “under pain of contempt.”212
According to the opinion, when a committee threatens to use its contempt
power, that is the point at which the lawyer becomes required by law to
disclose client confidences, and a lawyer need not risk criminal
prosecution.213 The Commerce Committee’s actions in successfully
obtaining attorney-client information in this case, and the subsequent ethics
opinion approving of the attorneys’ compliance, dispel any notion that
attorneys violate ethics rules when they comply with congressional
subpoenas backed by the threat of contempt.214
Some have argued that if federal courts begin allowing Congress to
overcome the attorney-client privilege, a potentially abusive committee
chair could start obtaining the internal communications of lawyers and their
clients at will.215 This assertion is inaccurate and misplaced for several
reasons. As a preliminary matter, the fact that Congress has been exercising
its discretion over common law privileges is not a new or sudden
development—it is the status quo. Committees have been making their own
determinations on non-constitutional privileges for many years, and courts
have respected their authority to do so.216
This argument also fails to recognize that both witnesses and committees
have significant incentives to accommodate each other’s interests.217 There
is no question that the prospect of being held in contempt for refusing to
comply with a congressional subpoena can be strong motivation for
witnesses to accommodate congressional demands.218 In addition, publicly
traded companies may be required to report to shareholders, lenders,
auditors, or others when they become the subject of investigations, receive
subpoenas, are held in contempt, or face litigation, providing an additional
212. D.C. Bar, supra note 204.
213. Id. (referencing Off. of the Clerk, H.R., Memorandum Opinion of General Counsel to the
Clerk of the House of Representatives on Attorney-Client Privilege (1985), as reprinted in 132 Cong.
Rec. 3019, 3036, 3038 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1986) (“In the Congressional context, the ruling by the
Subcommittee chair that the privilege will not be accepted is the legal and functional equivalent [of] a
legal requirement or a court order. Failure to answer at that point constitutes a criminal violation.
Disclosure at that stage does not violate the Canons of Ethics nor the Bar Code of any jurisdiction.”)).
214. Id.
215. See, e.g., James Hamilton, Attorney-Client Privilege in Congress, 12 LITIG. MAG. 3 (1985)
(warning that “Members of Congress have diverse agendas and constituencies and leaving such
decisions to their discretion risks serious abuse”).
216. See also Ross, supra note 6, at 125 (noting that Hamilton “happens to disagree with the
position that the House has taken historically”).
217. Michael Davidson, Legal Couns. to the U.S. Senate, Senate’s Civil Remedy to Compel
Testimony and Document Production, in CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS: LEGAL ISSUES AND
PRACTICAL APPROACHES 55 (1986) (“In fact, subpoena enforcement proceedings are rare because the
Congress seldom needs to compel testimony.”).
218. Harold Damelin & Jennifer Peru Gary, Understanding and Defending Against a
Congressional Investigation 2, BLANK ROME, LLP (Fall 2007) (“In reality, a contempt proceeding can
be more damaging than complying with the subpoena.”).
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incentive to resolve disputes expeditiously.219 On the other hand, because
Congress operates in two-year legislative sessions, the possibility of lengthy
litigation strongly argues in favor of committees resolving disputes quickly
to obtain information in a timely way.220
This argument also discounts the burdensome and time-consuming
nature of the procedural and political hurdles involved with holding a
witness in contempt and adopting a contempt resolution that is referred to
court. Congress has reserved this power for a relatively small number of
cases that it concludes are most weighty. According to data from CRS and
other sources, the full House or Senate has voted to approve contempt
resolutions for any reason (not just for withholding attorney-client
communications) for fewer than two dozen individuals since 1980.221
The fact that there have been so few historical contempt cases may offer
little comfort to those concerned that an increasingly extremist climate in
Washington could lead to future misdeeds, particularly in light of recent
events.222 The answer to such an abuse, however, is not to compound it with
another. The judicial precedents detailed above demonstrate that federal
courts have reviewed congressional actions for violations of constitutional
protections, but have refrained from imposing common law privileges onto
congressional committees. Instead of obliterating the distinction between
common law and constitutional privileges, the check on potential
219. See, e.g., Deborah S. Birnbach, Do You Have to Disclose a Government Investigation?,
(HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Apr. 9, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/
2016/04/09/do-you-have-to-disclose-a-government-investigation/
[https://perma.cc/68QS-BPD3]
(reviewing disclosure requirements in securities laws).
220. In Mazars, for example, Trump filed two suits to block the three committees’ subpoenas in
2019, yet the Oversight Committee’s case was not settled until September 2022 and the other case
remains ongoing as of this writing more than three years later. Order Granting Motion for Voluntary
Dismissal, Trump v. Committee on Oversight & Reform, No. 1:19-cv-01136-AP (D.D.C. September 11,
2022); Joint Status Report, Trump v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. 1:19-cv-03826-ER (S.D.N.Y. September
27, 2022); see also Article One: Strengthening Congressional Oversight Capacity: Hearing Before the
H. Select Comm. on the Modernization of Cong., 117th Cong. 7 (2021) (testimony of Josh Chafetz)
(citing other examples of lengthy litigation and noting that “judicial pacing and other judicial choices
served to slow oversight of the Trump Administration across the board to such an extent as to render it
largely impotent”).
221. GARVEY, supra note 117, at 74–76, 82–84 (describing House floor votes relating to ten
individuals and Senate floor votes relating to six individuals from 1980 through 2014). In addition, since
2014, there have been House floor votes relating to seven more individuals: Attorney General William
P. Barr and former White House Counsel Donald F. McGahn, II, H.R. Res. 430, 116th Cong. (2019)
(relating to House Judiciary Committee investigation of Russian interference in 2016 election); Attorney
General William P. Barr (again) and Commerce Secretary Wilbur L. Ross, Jr., H.R. Res. 497, 116th
Cong. (2019) (relating to House Oversight and Reform Committee investigation of addition of
citizenship question to 2020 Census); and former Trump officials Stephen K. Bannon, H.R. Res. 730,
117th Cong. (2021), Mark Meadows, H.R. Res. 851, 117th Cong. (2021), and Peter K. Navarro and
Daniel Scavino, Jr., H.R. Res. 1037, 117th Cong. (2022) (relating to January 6 Committee investigation).
222. See, e.g., Li Zhou, 147 Republican Lawmakers Still Objected to the Election Results After
the Capitol Attack, VOX (Jan. 7, 2021, 3:28 PM), https://www.vox.com/2021/1/6/22218058/
republicans-objections-election-results [https://perma.cc/KTW4-V67M].
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congressional abuses must derive from the Constitution itself, and Part II
discusses some of the constitutional protections that recipients of
congressional subpoenas may raise, and that courts may decide.
II. CONGRESSIONAL SUBPOENA POWER AND CONSTITUTIONAL
PRIVILEGES
If Congress exercises its discretion to overcome assertions of attorneyclient privilege, recipients of congressional subpoenas could pursue at least
two potential constitutional avenues: they could claim a separate
constitutional basis to withhold certain information that may include some
attorney-client communications; or they could try to make the
unprecedented argument that the attorney-client privilege has constitutional
underpinnings despite the fact that it has always been considered a common
law privilege. I take up these points below by examining constitutional
privileges available to all individuals and to executive branch officials in
particular.
A. Constitutional Privileges for Individuals
Recipients of congressional subpoenas may invoke applicable privileges
that are based in the Constitution, and if these privileges are properly
asserted, congressional committees are bound to honor them.223
For example, in Quinn v. United States, a witness invoked his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination and other privileges to refuse
to answer questions from a subcommittee of the House Committee on UnAmerican Activities about his alleged membership in the Communist
Party.224 Both the witness and the government agreed that the witness could
invoke the Fifth Amendment, and the principal issue before the Court was
whether or not he had done so properly.225 The Court held that both
committees and courts must respect an assertion of the Fifth Amendment if
the language used is reasonably understood as an effort to invoke the
privilege.226 Recipients of congressional subpoenas have availed themselves
223. See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 112 (1959) (“Congress . . . must exercise its
powers subject to the limitations placed by the Constitution on government action.”).
224. 349 U.S. 155 (1955).
225. Id. at 162.
226. Id. at 162–63 (invocation of Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination “does not
require any special combination of words”). However, the Supreme Court has rejected an argument for
a “constitutionally protected” attorney-client privilege in the context of an attorney advising a client
about invoking the Fifth Amendment in a civil proceeding. Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 466 n.15
(1975) (rejecting a concurring opinion by Justice Stewart, asserting: “We are not aware that the Court
has ever identified a ‘constitutionally protected attorney-client’ privilege of the scope postulated by MR.
JUSTICE STEWART.”).
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of this Fifth Amendment protection to withhold testimony or documents that
may include attorney-client communications.227 Congress has passed
legislation creating a statutory procedure to overcome Fifth Amendment
assertions through a vote by a majority of the House or Senate or two-thirds
of the members of a committee to apply for a court order granting “use”
immunity to compel the witness to testify, but the decision to grant
immunity carries significant risk since it could scuttle criminal
convictions.228
Separately, a witness might try to argue that a committee’s decision not
to recognize the attorney-client privilege in a congressional proceeding
implicates the Sixth Amendment’s right to effective assistance of counsel.
However, the Sixth Amendment applies only to criminal prosecutions.229
Although the Supreme Court has repeatedly highlighted the importance of
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in criminal proceedings, it has never
held that its protections apply to witnesses appearing before Congress.230
227. For example, former Justice Department official Jeffrey Clark asserted the attorney-client
and other privileges in response to a subpoena from the January 6 Committee seeking information about
his efforts to use the Justice Department to press Georgia and other states to call special legislative
sessions to appoint new electors. Letter from Harry W. MacDougald, Couns. for Jeffrey Bossert Clark,
to Bennie G. Thompson, Chairman, H. Select Comm. to Investigate the Jan. 6th Attack on the U.S.
Capitol, 2 (Nov. 5, 2021). In response, the Committee held Clark in contempt, noting that “under
longstanding congressional precedent, recognition of common law privileges such as the attorney-client
privilege is at the discretion of congressional committees.” H. COMM. TO INVESTIGATE THE JAN. 6TH
ATTACK ON THE U.S. CAPITOL, RES. RECOMMENDING THAT THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FIND
JEFFREY BOSSERT CLARK IN CONTEMPT OF CONG. FOR REFUSAL TO COMPLY WITH A SUBPOENA DULY
ISSUED BY THE SELECT COMM. TO INVESTIGATE THE JAN. 6TH ATTACK ON THE U.S. CAPITOL, H.R. REP.
NO. 117-200, at 2, 18 (2021) (citing CRS CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT MANUAL, supra note 93 at 61–
64). Clark then invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. See H. Rules Comm.,
Meeting on H. Res. ___ (H. Rept. 117-200); H.R. 6119, YOUTUBE (Dec. 2, 2021),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvZ2kmeFuDI [https://perma.cc/KXN3-QF49] (testimony of Rep.
Liz Cheney, Vice Chair, H. Select Comm. to Investigate the Jan. 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol) (noting
that Clark “believes testimony about his interactions with President Trump would tend to incriminate
him and thus may subject him to criminal prosecution”); see also Press Release, H. Comm. to Investigate
the Jan. 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Thompson & Cheney Testimony at Rules Committee Meeting
(Dec.
2,
2021),
https://january6th.house.gov/news/press-releases/thompson-cheney-openingstatements-rules-committee-meeting-0 [https://perma.cc/MP92-BQHW]; H. COMM. TO INVESTIGATE
THE JAN. 6TH ATTACK ON THE U.S. CAPITOL, MEETING BEFORE THE H. COMM. ON RULES, H.R. REP.
NO. 117-200 (2021).
228. 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002, 6005. See also ROSENBERG, supra note 117, at 7–10 (describing court
decisions reversing the convictions of Iran-Contra figures Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North and Rear
Admiral John Poindexter after Congress granted them immunity); id. at 10 (citing Lawrence E. Walsh,
The Independent Counsel and the Separation of Powers, 25 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 9 (1988)) (“The legislative
branch has the power to decide whether it is more important perhaps even to destroy a prosecution than
to hold back testimony they need. They make that decision. It is not a judicial decision or a legal decision
but a political decision of the highest importance.”).
229. U.S. CONST., amend. VI; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684 (1984)
(“[T]his Court has recognized that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists, and is needed, in order
to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial.”).
230. See, e.g., Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 430 (1986) (noting that “the suggestion that the
existence of an attorney-client relationship itself triggers the protections of the Sixth Amendment
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The Supreme Court has entertained objections to congressional
subpoenas on First Amendment grounds,231 but courts have not held that
witnesses may invoke the First Amendment to withhold information from
Congress based on the attorney-client privilege.232 Some commentators
have argued that courts should recognize a First Amendment right to speak
with counsel that is “interwoven” with the right to effective assistance of
counsel.233 However, no court has done so, and these commentators
apparently concede that this theory would be especially challenging in light
of the Supreme Court’s 1935 opinion in Jurney v. MacCracken.234 In that
case, the Court held that Congress could use its inherent contempt authority
to arrest and try an attorney who, after invoking the attorney-client privilege
to withhold information in response to a Senate committee subpoena,
allowed some papers to be removed and destroyed.235 The committee
overruled the privilege, and the attorney eventually produced records to
which he still had access.236 As a result, the Court did not have to decide the
attorney-client privilege question, but the Court nevertheless held that the
Senate could still try him for having obstructed its work.237 Proponents of
the First Amendment attorney-client privilege theory acknowledge that the
Court “indirectly affirmed that withholding documents or testimony from
Congress on the basis of the attorney-client privilege was unjustifiable and
punishable.”238
With respect to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the
Supreme Court has never held that it requires Congress to recognize the
attorney-client privilege, but the Court has held that witnesses may
challenge the “pertinency” of congressional inquiries under the federal

misconceives the underlying purposes of the right to counsel” and that the “Sixth Amendment’s intended
function is not to wrap a protective cloak around the attorney-client relationship for its own sake”).
231. See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126 (1959) (upholding criminal contempt
conviction against witness asserting First Amendment defense before a subcommittee of the House
Committee on Un-American Activities) (“[T]he protections of the First Amendment, unlike a proper
claim of the privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment, do not afford a witness the
right to resist inquiry in all circumstances. Where First Amendment rights are asserted to bar
governmental interrogation, resolution of the issue always involves a balancing by the courts of the
competing private and public interests at stake in the particular circumstances shown.”).
232. See Wright, supra note 42, at 437–38 (reviewing First Amendment challenges to
congressional investigations, most of which have “roundly failed”).
233. Berthiaume & Ansley, supra note 200, at 229 (arguing that attorney-client privilege is
“embodied within First Amendment right to free speech and association”).
234. 294 U.S. 125 (1935).
235. Id. at 152.
236. Id. at 145–46.
237. Id. at 144, 148 (noting that privilege claim was “no longer an issue” because attorney
complied with subpoena, but that Congress may punish past actions that “obstruct the legislative
process”).
238. Berthiaume & Ansley, supra note 200, at 221.
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statute governing criminal contempt.239 When Congress passed this statute,
it provided criminal penalties for witnesses who refuse to answer questions
that are “pertinent to the inquiry” of a committee operating under the
authority of the House or Senate.240 Based on this requirement, the Supreme
Court held in Watkins v. United States that a conviction under the statute
was invalid when the House Un-American Activities Committee, which
purportedly was investigating Communist infiltration of labor groups, failed
to adequately explain the pertinency of its questions, including why it was
asking about individuals “completely unconnected with organized labor.”241
Although future witnesses could seek to challenge a committee’s demands
for attorney-client communications on this basis, the operative question is
not whether the communications fall under the common law privilege, but
rather whether the committee provides adequate justification to meet the
requirement of pertinency.242
James Hamilton, a former congressional investigator and outspoken
opponent of committee authority in this area, has made a different due
process argument, asserting that since Congress used its Article I authority
to adopt internal rules granting witnesses a limited privilege to be
accompanied by attorneys during certain congressional proceedings—and
since “many” committees regularly use their discretion to recognize the
attorney-client privilege—Congress must have “implicitly” granted
witnesses a due process right to withhold attorney-client communications
from Congress.243 This argument faces significant challenges. Most
239. See, e.g., Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957); Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S.
456, 467–68 (1961) (explaining that witnesses must be informed of committee rulings on privileges in
order to meet the requirements of due process and intent under the contempt statute); Barenblatt v.
United States, 360 U.S. 109, 123 (1959) (“Undeniably, a conviction for contempt under 2 U.S.C. § 192
cannot stand unless the questions asked are pertinent to the subject matter of the investigation.”).
240. 2 U.S.C. § 192.
241. Watkins, 354 U.S. at 213.
242. The Court in Watkins also pointed to several other limitations on committee activities and
authorities. For example, committees are “restricted to the missions delegated to them” by the House or
Senate, and “[n]o witness can be compelled to make disclosures on matters outside that area.” Id. at 206.
In addition, several years after Watkins, the Court held that a witness may challenge a conviction under
the criminal contempt statute if a committee’s investigation was not properly authorized under its own
rules. Gojack v. United States, 384 U.S. 702, 705 (1966) (“The subject of the inquiry was never specified
or authorized by the Committee, as required by its own rules, nor was there a lawful delegation of
authority to the Subcommittee to conduct the investigation.”). Witnesses may seek to use these and other
arguments to withhold information from Congress that includes attorney-client communications, but as
with the pertinency requirement, the determination is not whether the materials fall under the common
law privilege.
243. Hamilton, Attorney-Client Privilege, supra note 215, at 64 (“Rules allowing counsel—and
implicitly the right to communicate with counsel with no concern that confidences must be disgorged—
thus appear to have constitutional underpinnings. An argument can even be made—given the practice
of virtually all congressional committees to permit counsel and the policy of many to respect the
privilege—that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that the privilege be
recognized.”).
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importantly, it disregards the fact that both the House and Senate repeatedly
voted against requiring their committees to recognize the attorney-client
privilege, directly undermining the premise that Congress implied such a
privilege.244 It also discounts the fact that while many committees indeed
recognize the privilege, they also zealously safeguard their right to
overcome it when necessary to serve their legislative goals.245 Although
Hamilton argues that the attorney-client privilege should extend “at least”
to communications between attorneys advising their clients during
congressional proceedings covered by House or Senate rules, this argument
is less persuasive for attorney-client communications relating to past
matters under investigation by a committee.246 In any case, Hamilton
acknowledges that efforts to use due process arguments to require Congress
to provide other protections available in federal courts have been
unsuccessful.247
For example, in United States v. Fort, the D.C. Circuit held that
congressional investigations are “outside the guarantees of the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment and the confrontation right guaranteed in
criminal proceedings by the Sixth Amendment.”248 In that case, the court
upheld a criminal contempt conviction for a witness who refused to comply
with a congressional subpoena based on a claim that Congress violated his
rights to call his own witnesses and cross-examine others.249 The decision
highlighted that the Constitution does not require Congress to recognize
non-constitutional privileges, but that each chamber has used its own
discretion to do so in discrete cases.250 The court noted several instances in
244. See infra Part I.A. See also Beard, supra note 71, at 133 (noting that the “legislative history
and constitutional law clearly weigh in favor of congressional discretion when balanced against the
unconvincing legal arguments advanced by supporters of the privilege as a right”).
245. See infra Part I.B. See also United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892) (“It is no objection
to the validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The
power to make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted.”).
246. Hamilton, Attorney-Client Privilege, supra note 215, at 4, 64 (acknowledging that House and
Senate rules are limited to allowing witnesses to be represented by attorneys in certain circumstances,
but arguing that the attorney-client privilege should be honored “at least in this context”).
247. Id. at 64 (referring to Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960); United States v. Fort, 443
F.2d 670, 678–81 (1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 932 (1971); see infra notes 248–254 and accompanying
text).
248. Fort, 443 F.2d at 678–79 (“The right to present evidence in one’s own behalf and to confront
and cross examine one’s accusers are rights designed to protect the individual’s interests when the
Government seeks to impose criminal sanctions upon him. But the plain fact is that the congressional
investigation with which we are here concerned is an investigative proceeding and not a criminal
proceeding, and in such proceeding Congress is not empowered to adjudicate criminal sanctions on the
witness.”).
249. Id.
250. Id. at 680 (citing special rules for the Senate Committee on Government Operations’ ArmyMcCarthy hearings of 1954, which provided a limited right of cross-examination, but noting that the
Committee made clear that “these procedural rules are not in any way to establish a precedent” (quoting
S. REP. NO. 2507, at 2–3 (1954)).
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which committees have allowed cross-examination of witnesses in certain
special proceedings, while not in others.251 The court held that Congress’s
adoption of different procedures for different proceedings did not result in
an abdication to the judiciary of its authority to establish rules for its own
proceedings.
The court in Fort relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Hannah v.
Larche, which upheld investigative procedures established by Congress for
the Commission on Civil Rights, which was created as part of the Civil
Rights Act of 1957 to investigate voter suppression.252 The Court found that
the Due Process Clause did not require the Commission to provide
witnesses with information about the charges being investigated, the
identity of the complainants, or the right to cross-examine complainants or
other witnesses.253 The Court supported its position by drawing
comparisons to congressional investigations which, similarly, do not
recognize privileges that apply in adjudicative proceedings.254
Some, including Hamilton, have argued that allowing committees to
overcome the attorney-client privilege “flies in the face of the basic policy
underlying the attorney-client privilege.”255 This complaint raises a policy
issue rather than a legal one, and it gives no weight whatsoever to
Congress’s countervailing constitutional interests. When a committee
rejects an assertion of the attorney-client privilege, that determination may
go against the policy goals of the common law privilege, but it reflects
Congress’s conclusion that more pressing constitutional objectives must be
served.
On the other hand, a committee may determine that exercising its
discretion to recognize the attorney-client privilege may serve broader
interests. The Senate Watergate Committee is sometimes held up as an
example of a congressional investigation that recognized the attorney-client
251. Id. at 680–81 (“These include impeachment trials, investigations looking toward
impeachment, proceedings involving the privileges of a member and when a committee is directed to
determine whether there have been violations of the election laws. Such variances in committee
procedures from the procedures followed here are based on substantial differences in the nature of the
investigations, are permissible under the power of a committee to adopt rules of procedure it considers
to be appropriate for the examination of witnesses in a given investigation and do not help appellant.”)
(footnotes omitted).
252. 363 U.S. 420 (1960).
253. Id. at 441.
254. Id. at 444–45 (“A frequently used type of investigative agency is the legislative committee.
The investigative function of such committees is as old as the Republic . . . . The procedures adopted by
legislative investigating committees have varied over the course of years. Yet, the history of these
committees clearly demonstrates that only infrequently have witnesses appearing before congressional
committees been afforded the procedural rights normally associated with an adjudicative proceeding. In
the vast majority of instances, congressional committees have not given witnesses detailed notice or an
opportunity to confront, cross-examine and call other witnesses.”) (citations omitted).
255. Hamilton, Attorney-Client Privilege, supra note 215, at 64 (citing Upjohn v. United States,
449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)).
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privilege for certain witnesses.256 Sam Dash, the Chief Counsel of the
Committee, explained that Chairman Sam Ervin gave witnesses various
procedural privileges that the Constitution did not require him to provide,
such as allowing counsel to make objections, argue legal points, and suggest
questions to other witnesses.257 Dash’s point was not that these protections
were mandated by the Constitution or Senate rules, but that they helped the
Committee garner public trust, communicate its findings, and fulfill its
objectives more effectively.258 These are valid policy considerations that
committees may evaluate as they determine their approaches to future
investigations and fulfill their constitutional responsibilities.259
Finally, a committee may choose not to object to a federal court ruling
on a witness’ claim of attorney-client privilege in certain limited
circumstances that serve broader policy goals. Congress’s investigation into
the attack on the Capitol on January 6, 2021 illustrates this point.260 The
select committee established by the House, known as the January 6
Committee, issued a subpoena for documents and testimony from John
Eastman, one of Trump’s outside attorneys who became infamous for
authoring the “blueprint for a coup.”261 Like other Trump attorneys
implicated in the plot, Eastman refused to comply by invoking the Fifth

256. See, e.g., id. at 4; Hamilton, Can Congress Make Lawyers Talk?, supra note 34. But see
Joseph E. diGenova, No Attorney-Client Privilege for Clinton, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 1995 (“Ervin
refused to recognize the privilege for any government lawyer in the performance of official duties. He
declined, for example, to permit Justice Department official Robert Mardian to invoke it. Claims of
privilege were likewise rejected for G. Gordon Liddy, Bebe Rebozo and Herbert Kalmbach, President
Nixon’s personal attorney.”).
257. Samuel Dash, Former Chief Couns., S. Watergate Comm., in CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATIONS: LEGAL ISSUES AND PRACTICAL APPROACHES (1986) 101–102 (“[W]e allowed
challenges to evidence. We allowed presentation of questions to witnesses and also legal arguments.”);
see also id. at 101 (describing how committee chose not to call witnesses at public hearings to invoke
their Fifth Amendment rights).
258. Id. at 98 (“First, and most compelling, [is] the requirement of fairness, for, without it,
congressional investigations will not have the public’s confidence. They won’t have credibility and,
therefore, they will fail in their constitutional function of public information because that information
won’t be communicated. It will be taken by the pubic as merely a political manifestation or an effort to
expose unfairly and, therefore, the message won’t get across.”).
259. See Wright, supra note 42, at 405–06, 460 (acknowledging that “legislative self-regulation,
rather than constitutional law, is the primary mechanism for the establishment of congressional due
process,” and urging Congress to use its discretionary rulemaking authority to adopt a policy that
presumes the validity of the attorney-client and other privileges, but also provides a uniform standard
for overcoming these privileges when Congress chooses).
260. H.R. Res. 503 § 1, 117th Cong. (2021) (establishing H. Select Comm. to Investigate the Jan.
6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol) (the “January 6 Committee”).
261. Letter from Rep. Bennie G. Thompson, Chair, H. Select Comm. to Investigate the Jan. 6th
Attack on the U.S. Capitol, to John Eastman (Nov. 8, 2021) (transmitting subpoena for documents and
deposition). See also Luke Broadwater, Trump Lawyer Blamed Pence for Violence as Rioters Stormed
Capitol, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2021) (https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/30/us/politics/eastman-pencecapitol-riot.html [https://perma.cc/7SB8-XVYD] (citing members of both parties describing Eastman’s
memos).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4254169

498

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

VOL. 100:455

Amendment.262 The Committee then issued a separate subpoena to compel
his employer, Chapman University, to produce his emails to the
Committee.263 Eastman responded by filing suit in federal court seeking
injunctive relief to block Chapman from complying.264 He asserted a host
of privileges, including under the First Amendment and Fourth
Amendment, as well as under the common law attorney-client privilege.265
He did not assert a constitutional basis for the attorney-client privilege.
At that point, the Committee could have argued that the court should rule
only on the constitutional claims and, based on the Speech and Debate
Clause, defer to the Committee’s determination not to recognize the
common law attorney-client privilege.266 But the Committee informed the
court that it was not making that argument, instead acceding to the court
ruling on both the constitutional and attorney-client privilege claims.267 The
Committee made clear in its brief, however, that it reserved the right to
assert this argument in other proceedings.268 Ultimately, the court ruled in
favor of the Committee on both the constitutional and attorney-client
privileges269 and ordered Chapman to produce the majority of Eastman’s
emails from the time period between January 4 and 7, 2021.270
262. Letter from Charles Burnham, Couns. to John Eastman, to Rep. Bennie G. Thompson, Chair,
H. Select Comm. to Investigate the Jan. 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol (Dec. 1, 2021) (asserting Fifth
Amendment in response to subpoena for documents and testimony).
263. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 3, Eastman v. Thompson, No. 8:22-cv00099-DOC-DFM, 2022 WL1407965 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2022).
264. Id.
265. Id. at 3, 14–17.
266. This would have been consistent with the approach discussed in Section I.C, infra, describing
how Senate and House committees have successfully invoked the Speech and Debate Clause to block
suits for injunctive relief, including in Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975); Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 434 F. Supp. 773 (D.D.C. 1977); and In re Provident Life &
Accident Ins. Co., No. CIV-1-90-219, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21067 (E.D. Tenn. June 13, 1990).
267. Congressional Defendants’ Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Privilege Assertions at 37 n.73,
Eastman v. Thompson, No. 8:22-cv-00099-DOC-DFM (C.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2022).
268. Id. (“Congress has consistently taken the view that its investigative committees are not bound
by judicial common law privileges such as the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine.
See generally [CRS CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT MANUAL, supra note 93, at] 61–62. This aspect of
Congress’s investigative authority is rooted in the separation of powers inherent in the Constitution’s
structure. Id. Congress and its committees make decisions regarding such common law privileges by
balancing the important institutional, constitutional, and individual interests at stake on a case-by-case
basis. Here, Congressional Defendants have determined, consistent with their prerogatives, not to submit
an argument on this point. This is not, however, intended to indicate, in any way, that Congress or its
investigative committees will decline to assert this institutional authority in other proceedings.”).
269. Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Eastman v. Thompson, No.
8:22-cv-00099-DOC-DFM, 2022 WL 1407965 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2022) (regarding constitutional
claims); Order re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021, Eastman v, Thompson, No. 8:22cv-00099-DOC-DFM (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (regarding attorney-client claims).
270. Order re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 43, Eastman v. Thompson, No.
8:22-cv-00099-DOC-DFM, 2022 WL 1407965 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2022) (holding that Chapman must
produce 101 emails from the January 4–7 period, but could withhold ten that were not “pivotal” to the
investigation).
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There are several reasons the Committee may have chosen not to raise
its available objection and instead allow the court to rule on the merits of
the attorney-client privilege claim. Time is always a key consideration for
congressional investigations. In the Eastman case, the Committee clearly
viewed his claim as exceptionally weak, successfully arguing that even the
common law attorney-client privilege applicable in federal courts does not
extend to communications in furtherance of a crime.271 Allowing the court
to dispose of Eastman’s attorney-client privilege claim using the familiar
and well-recognized crime-fraud exception may have avoided a more
protracted appeal on the complicated merits of Congress’s Article I
authority.272 The flip-side of submitting to the court’s jurisdiction—other
than the risk of losing the case—was that the Committee then had to comply
with the court’s procedures for in camera review of additional records from
other time periods, a process that continued until the eve of the Committee’s
public hearings in June 2022.273
Another reason the January 6 Committee may have allowed the court to
rule on Eastman’s claim of attorney-client privilege is to enhance public
trust in, and support for, the investigation itself. Just as Chairman Nunn gave
Watergate witnesses certain protections he was not required to provide,
Chairman Bennie Thompson, Vice Chair Liz Cheney, and other members
of the January 6 Committee agreed to allow a federal court to rule on
Eastman’s attorney-client privilege claim when they were not required to do
so. In return, they obtained a significant benefit—nationwide recognition
that a federal court agreed with them about the potentially criminal nature
of Trump’s and Eastman’s actions,274 accompanied by a forceful judicial
declaration that the “illegality of the plan was obvious.”275 As one
271. Congressional Defendants’ Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Privilege Assertions at 37,
Eastman v. Thompson, No. 8:22-cv-00099-DOC-DFM (C.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-00099)
(citing In re Grand Jury Investigation, 810 F.3d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir. 2016)).
272. Chapman produced an additional 933 documents after Eastman withdrew his privilege claims
regarding those documents. Notice at 1–2, Eastman v. Thompson, No. 8:22-cv-00099-DOC-DFM (C.D.
Cal. May 6, 2022).
273. Id. at 2–3 (requesting that the court review additional documents in camera for production
to the Committee as it “prepares to present the conclusions of its investigation to the public through
hearings”); Order re Privilege of 599 Documents Dated November 3, 2020 - January 20, 2021, Eastman
v. Thompson, No. 8:22-cv-00099-DOC-DFM (C.D. Cal. June 7, 2022) (directing Eastman to disclose
additional documents two days before the January 6 Committee began its series of hearings on June 9,
2022).
274. See, e.g., Farnoush Amiri, Judge: Trump Likely Committed Crimes Related to Election,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 28, 2022), https://apnews.com/article/capitol-siege-elections-crime-donaldtrump-presidential-elections-7b25a5f116f56f73d60b6cb298386bb9
[https://perma.cc/8UJ7-Z4VH];
Luke Broadwater, Alan Feuer & Maggie Haberman, Federal Judge Finds Trump Most Likely Committed
Crimes Over 2020 Election, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/28/
us/politics/trump-election-crimes.html [https://perma.cc/8DDB-HDN4].
275. Order re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, supra note 270, at 36; see also id. at 44
(“Dr. Eastman and President Trump launched a campaign to overturn a democratic election, an action

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4254169

500

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

VOL. 100:455

commentator observed of the court’s opinion, “the history of the United
States has never seen an account of a president’s conduct quite so
devastating.”276
B. Constitutional Privileges for Executive Branch Officials
In addition to recognizing constitutional protections available to all
witnesses appearing before Congress, the Supreme Court has held that
presidents have a constitutional basis to assert executive privilege over
presidential communications. Using this authority, a president could seek to
assert executive privilege to withhold a subset of communications that
otherwise might have fallen under the common law attorney-client
privilege, but these communications must relate directly to presidential
decision-making, and the privilege may be overcome with a requisite
showing from Congress.
In United States v. Nixon, the Supreme Court held that President Nixon
had a constitutional basis to assert executive privilege over audio tapes of
his Oval Office conversations regarding Watergate, but that the privilege is
limited and may be overcome with a demonstrated, specific need.277
Applying this standard, the Court directed Nixon to produce the tapes for
use in a criminal trial.278 In a previous case involving the Senate’s effort to
obtain the Nixon tapes, Senate Select Committee v. Nixon, the D.C. Circuit
denied enforcement of a congressional subpoena, holding that the Senate
committee had not demonstrated that the tapes were “demonstrably critical”
to its functions.279 In particular, since the House Judiciary Committee had
begun impeachment proceedings and already had copies of the subpoenaed
tapes,280 the court found that the Senate committee’s oversight need was
“merely cumulative.”281 Notwithstanding the different results, both cases

unprecedented in American history. Their campaign was not confined to the ivory tower—it was a coup
in search of a legal theory. The plan spurred violent attacks on the seat of our nation’s government, led
to the deaths of several law enforcement officers, and deepened public distrust in our political process.”).
276. Benjamin Wittes, Donald Trump, John Eastman and the Silence of the Justice Department,
LAWFARE (Mar. 29, 2022, 3:28 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/donald-trump-john-eastman-andsilence-justice-department [https://perma.cc/8KGQ-EB2P]; see also Michael Barbaro, The Daily, “The
Illegality of the Plan Was Obvious,” N.Y. TIMES, at 22:13 (Apr. 4, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/
2022/04/04/podcasts/the-daily/trump-jan-6-eastman.html [https://perma.cc/NZM7-LRZN] (noting “the
irony of the fact that if John Eastman had just complied with the January 6 committee’s subpoenas, this
would never have happened,” and that “based on this ruling, he may have actually just strengthened their
hand”).
277. 418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974).
278. Id.
279. 498 F.2d 725, 731 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
280. Id. at 732.
281. Id.
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highlighted that a presidential claim of executive privilege is based on the
Constitution rather than common law.282
Two Circuit Courts have applied a common law analysis to reject
executive branch assertions of the attorney-client privilege in the context of
criminal proceedings, finding that the privilege is unavailable to
government employees. In the first case, Independent Counsel Kenneth
Starr sought through a grand jury subpoena to obtain documents created
during meetings attended by attorneys representing the White House
Counsel’s Office and Hillary Clinton relating to the Whitewater
investigation.283 The White House did not invoke executive privilege, but
instead relied solely on the common law attorney-client privilege and the
work product doctrine.284 In In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found no basis for the executive branch to
invoke the common law attorney-client privilege.285 Applying Upjohn and
Federal Rule of Evidence 501, the court identified no cases applying a
governmental attorney-client privilege in the context of a grand jury
investigation.286 As a result, the court held that the White House could not
use the attorney-client privilege to refuse to comply with the subpoena.287
The following year, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals issued a similar
ruling in In re Lindsey, which involved Starr’s investigation of the Monica
Lewinski matter.288 Noting that Congress authorized courts to recognize
common law attorney-client privilege claims through Rule 501,289 the court
found no basis for Deputy White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey to assert a
government attorney-client privilege to withhold information from the
federal grand jury.290 Notably, Brett Kavanaugh, who was serving on Starr’s
282. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 708, 711 (noting that executive privilege is “inextricably rooted in the
separation of powers under the Constitution”).
283. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 913 (8th Cir. 1997).
284. Id. at 914; see also id. at 919 (noting that, in Nixon, the Supreme Court “recognized that the
need for confidential presidential communication ‘can be said to derive from the supremacy of each
branch within its own assigned area of constitutional duties’” (quoting Nixon, 418 U.S. at 705)).
285. Id. at 921 (finding that “to allow any part of the federal government to use its in-house
attorneys as a shield against the production of information relevant to a federal criminal investigation
would represent a gross misuse of public assets”).
286. Id. at 917.
287. Id. at 924; see also Arthur B. Culvahouse, Jr., Has Attorney-Client Privilege Departed the
White House?, 63 NYU ANN. SURV. AM. L. 139, 147 (2007) (“The Supreme Court allowed the Eighth
Circuit’s decision in In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum to stand. That decision’s broad holding—
that there is no attorney-client privilege protecting White House Counsels’ advice to the President—
must be viewed as the law of the land when such evidence is sought by a federal grand jury or in any
related criminal proceeding.”).
288. 158 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam).
289. Id. at 1268.
290. Id. at 1266 (finding that, “[i]n the context of federal criminal investigations and trials, there
is no basis for treating legal advice differently from any other advice the Office of the President receives
in performing its constitutional functions”). Cf. In re Special Grand Jury No. 81-1, 676 F.2d 1005, 1007
(4th Cir. 1982) (finding that an assertion of personal, non-governmental attorney-client privilege before
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team at the time, joined the brief for the case, which drew a stark contrast
between the constitutional and common law privileges.291
After the Nixon cases were decided, the executive branch began taking
the position that executive privilege includes the common law attorneyclient privilege, but it cited no judicial precedent for such an expansive
approach. Opinions issued by the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal
Counsel (OLC) acknowledge the distinction between common law
privileges and the constitutional basis for the presidential communications
privilege, but they give little significance to their distinct origins. For
example, a 1982 OLC opinion on the confidentiality of the Attorney
General’s communications recognizes that the attorney-client privilege is a
common law evidentiary privilege in federal courts.292 Conceding that the
Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to Congress, the OLC opinion
nevertheless argues that claims of attorney-client privilege are “subsumed”
under claims of executive privilege when disputes arise between the
executive and legislative branches.293 An OLC opinion four years later also
argues that the attorney-client privilege is not generally considered to be
“distinct” from the executive privilege in disputes between the two
branches.294 Similarly, when President Trump asserted executive privilege
in 2019 during the congressional investigation of the addition of a
citizenship question to the Census, OLC’s opinion invoked Nixon’s standard
for executive privilege,295 acknowledged the common law roots of the
attorney-client privilege by citing Upjohn,296 and then attempted to fuse

a grand jury may be overcome if the United States Attorney makes “a preliminary showing of relevance
and need”).
291. Brief of Appellee United States at 4–8, In re Sealed Case, Nos. 98-3060, 98-3062, 98-3072,
1998 WL 35240369 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 26, 1998) (asserting that “[c]ommon-law governmental attorneyclient and work product privileges are neither as important nor as historically rooted as the presidential
communications privilege” and that “no case, no statute, no rule, no agency opinion—ever—has
concluded that a department or agency of the United States (or any state or local governmental entity)
can maintain common-law attorney-client and work product privileges in federal grand jury or criminal
trial proceedings”) (emphasis in original). Of course, the views of now-Supreme Court Justice
Kavanaugh may be different than when he was an advocate.
292. Confidentiality of the Att’y Gen.’s Commc’ns in Counseling the President, 6 Op. O.L.C. 481,
494 n. 24 (1982).
293. Id.
294. Response to Congressional Requests for Information Regarding Decisions Made Under the
Independent Counsel Act, 10 Op. O.L.C. 68, 78 (1986) (footnote omitted).
295. Assertion of Exec. Privilege Over Deliberative Materials Regarding Inclusion of Citizenship
Question on 2020 Census Questionnaire, 43 Op. O.L.C. 1, 5 (2019) (slip opinion) (“The Supreme Court
has recognized ‘the valid need for protection of communications between high Government officials and
those who advise and assist them in the performance of their manifold duties,’ concluding that ‘the
importance of this confidentiality is too plain to require further discussion.’” (quoting United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974))).
296. Id. at 6 (“In the common law, the attorney-client privilege ‘is the oldest of the privileges for
confidential communications.’” (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981))).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4254169

2022

HOUSE RULES

503

them together.297 Instead of citing any judicial precedent, OLC referred to
one of its own previous opinions.298
The scope of executive privilege over presidential communications is
narrow, however, and communications must relate directly to presidential
decision-making, according to In re Sealed Case (Espy).299 This unanimous
decision issued by the D.C. Circuit Court in 1997 involved a grand jury
subpoena for documents underlying a report compiled by the White House
Counsel’s office regarding allegations that Agriculture Secretary Mike Espy
had accepted gifts in violation of federal law.300 Since the president asserted
executive privilege, the court applied Nixon, explaining that
communications must be made by presidential advisers who prepare advice
for the president relating to a “quintessential and non-delegable Presidential
power.”301 The Espy decision distinguished the presidential
communications privilege based in the Constitution from another common
law privilege—the deliberative process privilege.302 The court described the
low standard for overcoming the common law deliberative process privilege
in judicial proceedings, noting that it “disappears altogether” when
government misconduct is alleged.303 The court did not have to rule on the
deliberative process privilege claim, however, because it found that all of
the documents withheld by the White House were subject to the
constitutionally based presidential communications privilege.304
297. Id. (asserting that executive privilege “also protects attorney-client communications and
attorney work product”).
298. Id. (citing Assertion of Exec. Privilege Regarding White House Couns.’s Off. Documents,
20 Op. O.L.C. 2, 3 (1996)).
299. 121 F.3d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
300. Id.
301. Id. at 745, 752–53, 757 (adding that the privilege applies to “communications which these
advisers solicited and received from others as well as those they authored themselves,” as well as those
“authored or received in response to a solicitation by members of a presidential adviser’s staff”); see id.
at 752 (“Not every person who plays a role in the development of presidential advice, no matter how
remote and removed from the President, can qualify for the privilege. In particular, the privilege should
not extend to staff outside the White House in executive branch agencies. Instead, the privilege should
apply only to communications authored or solicited and received by those members of an immediate
White House adviser’s staff who have broad and significant responsibility for investigating and
formulating the advice to be given the President on the particular matter to which the communications
relate.”).
302. Id. at 745 (“The presidential privilege is rooted in constitutional separation of powers
principles and the president’s unique constitutional role; the deliberative process privilege is primarily
a common law privilege.”).
303. Id. at 746. The court emphasized that the privilege is routinely denied on the grounds that
shielding government deliberations in this context does not serve the public interest in honest, effective
government. Id. at 738 (quoting Texaco Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Dep’t of Consumer Affs., 60 F.3d 867, 855
(1st Cir. 1995)); In re Subpoena Served Upon Comptroller of Currency, & Sec’y of Bd. of Governors
of Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 967 F.2d 630, 634 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“the privilege may be overridden where
necessary . . . to ‘shed light on alleged government malfeasance’”) (quoting In re Franklin Nat’l Bank
Sec. Litig., 478 F. Supp. 577, 582 (E.D.N.Y 1979)).
304. In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 758.
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One curious district court case has held that, although the deliberative
process privilege originated in common law, it implicates constitutional
separation of powers issues when asserted by the executive branch before
Congress. In Committee on Oversight and Government Reform v. Holder,
the Committee subpoenaed Justice Department documents relating to
Operation Fast and Furious, in which federal agents allowed straw
purchasers to transfer firearms into Mexico to track drug cartel leaders.305
The court held that the Department had a constitutional basis to assert the
deliberative process privilege before the Committee, but that it carries a
lower threshold than the presidential communications privilege.306 The
court ultimately found that the privilege had to yield and ordered the Justice
Department to produce many of the documents.307 Although both parties
disagreed with parts of the decision, they settled the case before any
appellate ruling was issued.308
The legal basis for the ruling in Holder is questionable as it appears to
misread Espy and omits a key case cited by the D.C. Circuit Court.309 As a
result, serious concerns have been raised about the decision.310 Some have
suggested that the Holder opinion offers a cautionary tale for future
committees that act in ways that appear irresponsible, thereby increasing the
risk that a court may strain to counter potentially abusive conduct.311
305. 979 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2013).
306. Order Denying Summary Judgment at 3, Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. Lynch,
156 F. Supp. 3d 101 (D.D.C. Aug. 20, 2014) (No. 1:12-cv-01332).
307. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. Lynch, 156 F. Supp. 3d 101, 106 (D.D.C. 2016)
(No. 1:12-cv-01332).
308. Motion for Voluntary Dismissal with Prejudice, Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform v.
Barr, No. 16-5078 (D.D.C. May 8, 2019); Order Granting Motion for Voluntary Dismissal, Comm. on
Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. Barr, No. 16-5078 (D.D.C. June 5, 2022).
309. The Holder opinion began by citing In re Sealed Case, which noted that the deliberative
process privilege originated as a common law privilege that agencies frequently invoke in litigation
under FOIA, which grants the executive branch an exemption to withhold certain deliberative materials
from the public, but not from Congress. Order Denying Summary Judgment, supra note 306, at 1–2
(citing In re Sealed Case, 121 F.2d at 736–37). But the Holder court went on to hold that the privilege
could be asserted before Congress, citing a footnote in Espy suggesting that asserting the deliberative
process privilege could raise “constitutional separation of powers.” Id. (citing In re Sealed Case, 121
F.2d at 737 n.4). However, the case cited in In re Sealed Case’s footnote—a case omitted in the Holder
opinion—held that courts lack authority to second-guess adjudicative proceedings that Congress
authorizes federal agencies to conduct. Id. (omitting citation to United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409,
421–22 (1941)). The separation of powers concern in that case was that the judiciary may not intervene
in determinations assigned by the legislature to the executive—not that the executive branch has a
constitutional basis to withhold deliberative material from Congress. Morgan, 313 U.S. at 413, 422
(holding that “it was not the function of the court to probe the mental processes of the Secretary”)
(emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). The Holder court also seemed to disregard In re Sealed
Case’s warning that its opinion “should not be read as in any way affecting the scope of the privilege in
the congressional-executive context.” In re Sealed Case, 121 F.2d at 753.
310. See, e.g., Bopp et al., supra note 17, at 20 (referring to court’s “strained reading of Espy”);
ROSENBERG, supra note 111, at 72–73.
311. At the time of the decision, there was widespread criticism of the Committee for not calling
available witnesses to testify, including the Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms,
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To briefly recap these precedents, no court to date has indicated that the
attorney-client privilege is anything but a common law privilege. Under
Congress’s Article I rulemaking authority and its inherent investigative
power, committees have exercised discretion for many years to make their
own determinations about whether to recognize the attorney-client privilege
in their own proceedings. This is similar to the independent authority of
states to determine the scope of the attorney-client and other nonconstitutional privileges in their jurisdictions. For these reasons, federal
courts historically have declined to interfere with the decisions of Congress
or the states on these matters, and the Supreme Court has expressed great
concern with courts reviewing congressional actions for anything other than
constitutional deficiencies.
This is why Chief Justice Roberts’s apparent suggestion in Mazars—that
Congress must now recognize the common law attorney-client privilege
developed by federal courts—raises such difficult questions. He did not
identify a constitutional basis for applying the privilege to Congress, but
referred to it as a common law privilege.312 Under this theory, would the
federal judiciary also have the ability to dictate to Congress “the full
panoply” of other protections available in federal courts,313 such as the right
to call and cross-examine witnesses or object to hearsay,314 regardless of
whether there is a constitutional basis to extend them to Congress? Would
states also be subject to the determinations of federal judges on nonconstitutional privileges? And would federal agencies now be able to wall
off the actions of any government attorney offering any legal advice as long
or adequately considering accommodations offered by the Department before going to court. See, e.g.,
Editorial,
A
Pointless
Partisan
Fight,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
20,
2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/21/opinion/a-pointless-partisan-fight.html [https://perma.cc/KAS8P5PY]; Juan Williams, Darrell Issa’s Fast and Furious Campaign Against Team Obama, FOX NEWS
(May 7, 2015, 12:04 AM), https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2012/05/15/darrell-issa-fast-and-furiouscampaign-against-team-obama/ [https://perma.cc/Y965-237S]; Ned Resnikoff, Michael Steele on Issa’s
Contempt Vote for Holder: ‘The Optics Are Not Good for the GOP,’ MSNBC (June 20, 2012, 12:58
PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/michael-steele-issas-contempt-vote-holder-optics-arenot-good-flna838126 [https://perma.cc/9R8T-M2LV]. Several minority ranking members, while
expressing strong support for the Committee’s authority to obtain information necessary to its legislative
functions, nevertheless warned that the Committee was risking damage to its ability to conduct effective
oversight by rushing to court. Memorandum Amici Curiae of Representatives Elijah E. Cummings, John
Conyers, Jr., Henry A. Waxman, Edolphus Towns, & Louise M. Slaughter in Support of Dismissal at 1,
2, 8; Committee on Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013).
312. See, e.g., Trump v. Mazars, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2032 (2020) (referring to attorney-client
privilege as common law privilege).
313. Bopp et al., supra note 17, at 48.
314. See, e.g., James Steiner-Dillon, Why Hearsay Isn’t a Problem for Congress in Impeachment
Hearings, CONVERSATION (Nov. 20, 2019, 1:51 PM), https://theconversation.com/why-hearsay-isnt-aproblem-for-congress-in-impeachment-hearings-127164 [https://perma.cc/GZ7L-UMXG]; FED. R.
EVID. 802 (Rule Against Hearsay) (applying only to federal courts); see also Wright, supra note 42, at
461 (noting that hearsay is admissible in congressional hearings, but urging Congress to use its
discretionary rulemaking power to provide “rebuttal or confrontation rights”).
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as it meets the common law standard, thereby shifting the balance of power
even further towards the executive branch?315
Part III examines whether there may be another interpretation of the
Chief Justice’s sentence that comports with existing precedents without
upsetting the constitutional balance of power.
III. ALTERNATIVE READING OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE’S POSITION IN MAZARS
Since the Mazars decision was issued, there have been various
interpretations of Chief Justice Roberts’s position on attorney-client
privilege, including two from opposite ends of the spectrum: one argues that
his sentence was nothing more than erroneous and ill-informed dictum,
while the other argues that he intended to announce a sweeping change to
the way Congress and courts historically have handled the attorney-client
privilege. Adopting either of these theories could suggest a lack of respect
by the Supreme Court for Congress as a co-equal branch of government—
through inattention or intention. Either the Court failed to exercise due
diligence in understanding how Congress works, or it intended to override
decades of congressional precedent without explanation and impose its own
judicially developed common law rules on the legislative branch.316 After
assessing these interpretations below, I offer evidence for an additional,
more charitable reading that is consistent with separation of powers
principles, congressional precedents, and judicial rulings.
Under the first interpretation, there is a strong argument that the Chief
Justice’s line in Mazars is simply irrelevant, inaccurate, and non-binding

315. Indeed, in the lead-up to the Mazars decision, Trump had already refused to recognize the
legitimacy of any congressional requests he opposed, declaring on the White House lawn: “We’re
fighting all the subpoenas.” Charlie Savage, Trump Vows Stonewall of ‘All’ House Subpoenas, Setting
Up Fight Over Powers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/24/us/politics/
donald-trump-subpoenas.html [https://perma.cc/Y236-3298]. He and his aides blocked the production
of documents not only from his accounting firm, but from multiple agencies and the White House. See,
e.g., Elijah Cummings, Opinion, The White House Hasn’t Turned Over a Single Piece of Paper to My
Committee, WASH. POST (Mar. 19, 2019, 5:24 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/elijahcummings-presidential-harassment-more-like-unprecedented-obstruction/2019/03/19/8382d0fc-4a6a11e9-b79a-961983b7e0cd_story.html [https://perma.cc/RFK3-G936]. Trump’s actions intensified
through the first impeachment inquiry, directing all federal agencies and employees to withhold all
documents and testimony even as Congress’s authority to compel information was at its zenith, leading
the House to pass a second article of impeachment for Obstruction of Congress. Articles of Impeachment
Against Donald John Trump, H.R. Res. 755, 116th Cong. (2019); H. PERMANENT SELECT COMM.
INTELL., THE TRUMP-UKRAINE IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY REP., H.R. REP. NO. 116–335, at 216 (2019)
(prepared in consultation with the House Committee on Oversight & Reform and the House Committee
on Foreign Affairs).
316. Josh Chafetz’s analysis of Mazars makes a similar criticism about the Court’s decision on
the merits, asserting that it is continuing a trend begun with the Nixon cases of “aggrandizing judicial
institutions at the expense of Congress” and selling “an exalted view of judicial process, coupled with a
degraded view of congressional process”). Chafetz, supra note 17, at 128, 139, 144.
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dictum.317 Trump was not relying on the attorney-client privilege before the
Court, so it was not at issue or addressed by the parties, and there are “grave
doubts” about whether the Constitution requires congressional committees
to recognize common law privileges.318 Under this theory, it is possible that
the Chief Justice was unfamiliar with the historical congressional
precedents discussed above, so he carelessly combined the common law and
constitutional privileges together. Admittedly, the idea of committees ruling
on assertions of attorney-client privilege may be a foreign concept for
attorneys and judges who worked in the executive branch and now practice
primarily before, and within, the judicial branch.319 As some have argued,
the fact that seven Justices previously held high-level positions in the
executive branch may have predisposed them to make assumptions about
congressional practice that are incorrect.320 In any case, erroneous dicta has
“staying power” and should be corrected, as the author of the 2003 CRS
report cited by the Chief Justice has warned.321
A second possibility is that Chief Justice Roberts meant to assert that
courts should impose their own determinations regarding claims of common
law attorney-client privilege onto congressional committees. As some
commentators have noted, subpoena recipients are more likely to litigate
attorney-client privilege assertions in court “now that the highest court in
the land has endorsed the applicability of common law privileges as
defenses to congressional subpoenas.”322 Prior to the Mazars decision,
practitioners routinely advised their clients that it was up to committees—
not federal judges—to decide whether to recognize the attorney-client

317. See, e.g., Michael Stern, Mazars and Common Law Privileges Before Congress, POINT OF
ORDER (July 10, 2020), https://www.pointoforder.com/2020/07/10/mazars-and-common-lawprivileges-before-congress/ [https://perma.cc/JB69-6QBU] (“Congress has long asserted that it is not
obligated to respect common law privileges such as the attorney-client privilege,” and “the Supreme
Court’s poorly researched dicta on this point should not be given any weight.”).
318. THE NEW WIGMORE: EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES § 6.4.3 (noting that it is “debatable how
much weight should be attached” to the Chief Justice’s statement since “it is technically dictum,” and
adding that “[i]f the Congress possesses the greater power to completely preclude judicial recognition
of privileges, it would seem to follow that it may also assert the lesser power to disregard such privileges
in its own investigations”).
319. See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 17, at 3 (“Many lawyers, good and bad, are mystified as to
how a congressional investigation works. They don’t know what powers Congress has; they don’t know
what the limitations are on those powers.”).
320. David Janovsky & Sarah Turberville, Congress Needs to Reclaim Its Time from the Courts,
PROJECT ON GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT (Nov. 18, 2020), https://www.pogo.org/analysis/2020/11/
congress-needs-to-reclaim-its-time-from-the-courts [https://perma.cc/YMB2-J5D4] (noting that of
these seven Justices, six held positions in the White House or at the Justice Department).
321. Louis Fisher, The Staying Power of Erroneous Dicta: From Curtiss-Wright to Zivotofsky,
31 CONST. COMMENT. 149, 149 (2016) (asserting that the “responsible step for the Supreme Court is to
revisit the mistake and correct it”).
322. Bopp et al., supra note 17, at 48.
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privilege.323 Since the Mazars decision was issued, practitioners have been
looking forward to taking advantage of the Chief Justice’s sentence to
benefit their clients.324 Attorneys now cite the line in Mazars to try to
withhold attorney-client information from committees, and committees
continue to insist that it is within their prerogative to determine whether to
accept assertions of non-constitutional privileges.325 Although there is little
evidence that the Chief Justice meant to announce such a sweeping change
with so little fanfare, even parties who would benefit from this interpretation
acknowledge that the line is not binding on lower courts.326
As an aside, it is also possible that the Chief Justice meant to do nothing
more than reflect that witnesses may assert the attorney-client privilege,
while leaving unsaid the distinction that committees are normally the final
arbiters for common law privileges and courts have the final say for
constitutional privileges. This appears to be how CRS interprets the Chief
Justice’s sentence in its most recent Congressional Oversight Manual.327
323. See, e.g., Damelin & Gary, supra note 218 (“In light of the strong constitutional
underpinnings of Congress’s investigatory power, a congressional committee’s recognition of the
common law attorney-client privilege, which has no constitutional foundation, likely will rest within the
sound discretion of the respective committee.”).
324. Robert Kelner & Perrin Cooke, The Supreme Court’s Mazars Decision Contains a
Significant Suggestion That Congress May Be Bound by the Attorney-Client Privilege in Congressional
Investigations, INSIDE POL. L. (July 9, 2020), https://www.insidepoliticallaw.com/2020/07/09/thesupreme-courts-mazars-decision-contains-a-significant-suggestion-that-congress-may-be-bound-bythe-attorney-client-privilege-in-congressional-investigations/ [https://perma.cc/3PLU-UWQK] (“[T]he
Court’s approving recognition of the view that the privilege does apply to Congress will surely prove
helpful to parties fighting efforts by congressional investigators to compel disclosure of privileged
material.”); Andrew Wright, Supreme Court’s Trump v. Mazars Ruling Gave Attorney-Client Privilege
a Boost in Congress, JUST SEC. (Aug. 12, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/71970/supreme-courtstrump-v-mazars-ruling-gave-attorney-client-privilege-a-boost-in-congress/
[https://perma.cc/24GJ5427] (“[T]hose of us in private practice that assist parties in investigations will make great use of that
language whenever privilege issues arise.”).
325. For example, during a recent investigation by the House Committee on Oversight and Reform
into allegations from dozens of Washington Commanders employees regarding toxic workplace
conditions, an attorney for one deponent asserted that the “recent Supreme Court precedent from
Mazars . . . clearly established this through dicta that there is recognized attorney-client privileges within
congressional investigations.” HOUSE COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & REFORM, Deposition of Brian Lafemina
(Mar. 30, 2022), at 203. The Committee’s position remained unchanged, noting that the House of
Representatives and the Committee “do not recognize any common-law nondisclosure privileges,
including . . . attorney-client privilege.” Id. at 9; see also id. at 206–09. After suspending the deposition
to allow the deponent to consult further with the Commanders, the witness withdrew the attorney-client
privilege assertion and answered the Committee’s questions. HOUSE COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & REFORM,
Supplemental Deposition of Brian Lafemina (Apr. 8, 2022), at 6–24.
326. Kelner & Cooke, supra note 324 (“Of course, the question of the applicability of the attorneyclient privilege to congressional investigations was not squarely before the Court in Mazars, and the
Court’s brief aside on this subject may be easily cast as dicta.”); Wright, supra note 324 (acknowledging
that the line is “classic dicta”).
327. CRS CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT MANUAL, supra note 93, at 62–63 (noting that while the
Chief Justice’s line is unclear, he “did not go so far as to state that common-law privileges can be used
to shield information from Congress,” and the line “only suggests that witnesses have been ‘understood’
to ‘retain’ certain common-law privileges,” which may be a reference to the fact that “committees at
times choose to recognize and accept common-law privileges, especially the attorney-client privilege”).
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Another interpretation which, to my knowledge, has not been explored,
is that recipients of congressional subpoenas who are compelled to produce
information to Congress retain their right to assert the attorney-client
privilege in other venues. In other words, complying with mandatory
demands from Congress does not constitute a general waiver of the privilege
in separate judicial proceedings that may involve the same parties or
underlying facts, but are distinct from a committee’s investigation. To be
clear, this interpretation refers to involuntary disclosures compelled by
Congress. Practitioners warn their clients not to voluntarily produce
privileged documents on the theory that a committee later may compel them
because this will “compound the waiver problem.”328 Practitioners also
warn clients that voluntary disclosures may give rise to inconsistent
resolutions under the selective waiver doctrine.329 Under this alternative
interpretation, whether the privilege ultimately applies in separate
proceedings is not guaranteed, but is decided by courts based on various
factual and legal determinations.330
There is compelling evidence for this alternative reading. Consider the
sole source for the Chief Justice’s assertion: the 2003 CRS report.331 In the
section of that report cited by the Chief Justice, CRS describes a famous
investigation conducted by the Senate Whitewater Committee in 1995 that
focused on a key concern expressed by the White House, which was that
complying with the Committee’s subpoena could risk a general waiver of
the privilege in other proceedings.332 The CRS report describes notes taken
by Associate White House Counsel William Kennedy during a meeting with
328. AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWS., supra note 73, at 12 (2010).
329. See, e.g., Bopp & Lay, supra note 75, at 924–25 (noting split among circuits). In addition,
Congress passed legislation in 2008 to adopt Federal Rule of Evidence 502, which provides that a
disclosure to a federal office or agency that waives the attorney-client privilege does not extend to
undisclosed information on the same subject unless the waiver was intentional and both the disclosed
and undisclosed information “ought in fairness to be considered together.” Pub. L. No. 110–322 § 1(a),
122 Stat. 3537 (Sept. 19, 2008).
330. These may include whether witnesses properly preserved the privilege before Congress by
taking sufficient steps to resist subpoenas, whether the privilege is available in different civil and
criminal contexts, or whether the conduct of attorneys falls under the crime-fraud or other exceptions.
For information that is made public by government agencies or Congress, courts apply evidentiary rules
to determine its admissibility in separate proceedings. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803(8) (public records
exception to hearsay rule); Ponce v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr. for S. Cal., 774 F.2d 1401, 1403 (9th
Cir. 1985) (Senate report admissible to corroborate evidence for expert testimony), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 890 (1986); Bright v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 756 F.2d 19, 22–23 (6th Cir. 1984) (House
report not admissible for subjective conclusions rather than factual findings); Barry v. Trs. of Int’l Ass’n
Full-Time Salaried Officers & Emps. of Outside Loc. Unions & Dist. Couns.’s (Iron Workers) Pension
Plan, 467 F. Supp. 2d 91, 97, 101 (2006) (D.D.C. 2006) (Senate report admissible, but House report
inadmissible, based on four non-exhaustive factors for public records exception to hearsay rule) (citing
Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 167 n.11 (1988)).
331. Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2031 (2020) (citing 2003 CRS REPORT, supra
note 5, at 16–18)
332. 2003 CRS REPORT, supra note 5, at 16–18.
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the President’s private attorneys over which the President invoked the
attorney-client privilege.333 The White House sent a letter to the Committee
stating: “all we need is an assurance that other investigative bodies will not
use this as an excuse to deny the President the right to lawyer confidentiality
that all Americans enjoy.”334 According to the CRS report, this was
consistent with the Committee’s view, which Chairman Alfonse D’Amato
was willing to put in writing.335 Similarly, the Chairman of the House
Banking Committee, Rep. Jim Leach, announced that the House would not
try to assert that the President’s compliance with this mandatory
congressional demand would constitute a general waiver in other
proceedings.336
In a separate part of the Mazars opinion, Chief Justice Roberts provided
his own summary of this dispute, and he highlighted how the Senate
Whitewater Committee in fact obtained the attorney-client information after
resolving the White House’s waiver concern.337 The White House would
have had little incentive to negotiate this resolution if it could have claimed
that the attorney-client privilege applies before Congress as a matter of
right.
This alternative interpretation is even more convincing in light of the
contempt report adopted by the Senate Whitewater Committee, which also
makes clear that the principal concern was whether the White House would
waive the privilege in other proceedings if it complied with the
Committee’s subpoena.338 The contempt report notes that the White House
offered to produce the notes if the Committee agreed to several conditions,
333. Id.
334. Id. at 18 (citing 141 CONG. REC. 37730 (1995)) (emphasis added).
335. Id. at 17 (agreeing to “send a letter saying we do not feel that there would be any waiver of
any privilege, that the administration’s turning over the notes would not be deemed a waiver in our
eyes”).
336. Id. at 18 (citing Susan Schmidt, Whitewater Notes Being Surrendered, WASH. POST, Dec. 22,
1995, at A1; Charles Tiefer, The Specially Investigated President, 5 U. CHI. ROUNDTABLE at 189–93).
A year after Louis Fisher authored the 2003 CRS report, he published a book providing even more
information, including an additional quote from Chairman Leach stating: “It is well-established by
congressional precedent and practice that acceptance of a claim of attorney-client privilege rests in the
sole and sound discretion of Congress, and cannot be asserted as a matter of right.” LOUIS FISHER, THE
POLITICS OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE 106 (2004).
337. Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2030–31 (2020) (“Eventually the parties
reached an agreement, whereby President Clinton avoided the threatened suit, agreed to turn over the
notes, and obtained the Senate’s concession that he had not waived any privileges.”) (citing S. REP. NO.
104-204, at 16–17 (1996); 2003 CRS REPORT, supra note 5, at 16–18).
338. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFS., REP. ON REFUSAL OF WILLIAM H.
KENNEDY, III, TO PRODUCE NOTES SUBPOENAED BY THE SPEC. COMM. TO INVESTIGATE WHITEWATER
DEVELOPMENT CORP. AND RELATED MATTERS, S. REP. NO. 104-191 (1995). The minority members of
the Committee agreed, writing that the “White House letter made clear that its principal concern
remained the waiver issue” and that “the principal issue remaining is the risk that producing the Kennedy
notes to the Special Committee might be construed as a general waiver of the attorney-client privilege.”
Id. at 24, 27.
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including acknowledging that the meeting was privileged and that no
privileges had been waived.339 The Committee refused to recognize the
meeting as privileged, but agreed that producing the notes would not
constitute a waiver in other proceedings.340 The contempt report observes
that a congressional subpoena, like a court order, is compulsory and that
compelled disclosures do not result in waivers.341 Highlighting Congress’s
discretionary power to recognize claims of attorney-client privilege,342 the
report concludes that failing to honor Congress’s authority in this regard
effectively would have blocked it from receiving the information and shut
down negotiations before they started.343
On December 20, 1995, the full Senate voted to confirm the Committee’s
decision to reject the assertion of attorney-client privilege in this case.344
During debate on the Senate floor, Senator Orrin Hatch, then the Chair of
the Judiciary Committee, explained his support for the resolution and gave
a thorough recitation of Congress’s constitutional authority to rule on
assertions of attorney-client privilege. Since Chief Justice Roberts pointed
to this specific investigation as support for his sentence in Mazars,
Chairman Hatch’s statement is worth quoting in detail:
As chairman of the Judiciary Committee, I see it as my duty to defend
the prerogatives of the executive branch and the separation of powers.
Indeed, I recognize that the executive branch has a right to
confidential communications regarding its core functions. After
giving this issue careful thought and consideration, however, I have
decided that enforcing the subpoena is the proper course of action to
take. This issue transcends claims of partisanship and goes to the very
339. Id. at 8. This report also noted that “Counsel for the President and Mrs. Clinton and the White
House have expressed the concern that disclosure of the Kennedy notes would result in a broad waiver
of the attorney-client privilege.” Id. at 9.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 9–10 (noting that “an order from a congressional committee is no less compulsory than
an order from a court,” and “courts have recognized that disclosure of documents in response to a court
order is compelled, not voluntary, and, therefore, that such disclosure does not function as a waiver
against future assertions of privilege”) (citing Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Phil., 951
F.2d 1414, 1427 n.14 (3d. Cir. 1991); Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1221–22 (D.C.
Cir. 1981); MODEL CODE OF PRO. RESP. DR 4-101(C)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980) (“A lawyer may reveal:
. . . [c]onfidences of secrets when . . . required by law or court order.”)).
342. Id. at 11 (citations omitted) (“It is within the sound discretion of Congress to decide whether
to accept a claim of attorney-client privilege. . . . Unlike some other testimonial privileges, such as the
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, . . . the attorney-client privilege itself is not rooted in
the Constitution. . . . Rather, the attorney-client privilege is a product of the common law and is observed
in federal courts by virtue of the Federal Rules of Evidence . . . . ”) (citations omitted).
343. Id. at 14 (noting that requiring the common law privilege to apply before Congress “would
give the Executive Branch the power substantially to impair the Congress’s ability to perform its
constitutional responsibility to “probe[] into departments of the Federal Government to expose
corruption, inefficiency or waste” (citing Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 184 (1957)).
344. Record Vote 610, S. Res. 199, 104th Cong. (1995).
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constitutional authority of Congress to investigate wrongdoing at the
highest levels of Government.
The Senate has a constitutional obligation to conduct oversight
hearings. It is a duty we must not surrender. . . .
[T]he President not only claims that the November 5 Whitewater
meeting is cloaked in attorney-client privilege, but that the privilege
applies against Congress. No Congress in history, however, has
recognized the existence of a common-law privilege that trumps the
constitutionally authorized investigatory powers of Congress. While
Congress has chosen, as a matter of discretion, to permit clear,
legitimate claims of privilege, it has never allowed its constitutional
authority to investigate wrongdoing in the executive branch to be
undermined by universal recognition of the attorney-client privilege.
As Senator Sarbanes has noted, we have chosen, in our discretion, to
recognize the privilege with respect to some of the witnesses who
have testified before the Committee.
The attorney-client privilege exists as only a narrow exception to
broad rules of disclosure. And the privilege exists only as a statutory
creation, or by operation of State common law. No statute or Senate
or House rule applies the attorney-client privilege to Congress. In
fact, both the Senate and the House have explicitly refused to
formally include the privilege in their rules. As the Clerk of the House
stated in a memorandum opinion in 1985: “attorney-client privilege
cannot be claimed as a matter of right before a congressional
committee.” The attorney-client privilege is a rule of evidence that
generally applies only in court; it does not apply to Congress which,
under article I, section 5 of the Constitution, has the sole authority to
“determine the Rules of its Proceedings.”345
Two days later, the White House turned over the attorney-client
documents, and front-page news accounts noted how the waiver issue had
been successfully resolved.346 According to a report issued by the Senate
Whitewater Committee the following month—which is also cited by the

345. 141 CONG. REC. S18961–62 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995) (citations omitted).
346. See, e.g., Susan Schmidt, Whitewater Notes Being Surrendered, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 1995,
at A1 (“After a dramatic Senate vote Wednesday to enforce a subpoena for the notes, White House
lawyers agreed to terms set by House Banking and Financial Services Committee Chairman Jim Leach
(R-Iowa) stating that the House would not try to assert later that the president had waived his attorneyclient privilege. A White House spokesman said the material would be released today to the Senate
Whitewater committee and the media.”).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4254169

2022

HOUSE RULES

513

Chief Justice in Mazars—the notes turned out to be highly relevant and
identified “numerous investigative avenues for the Committee.”347
To take a step back, the specific investigation highlighted by the Chief
Justice to support his assertion in Mazars is one in which Congress: (1)
overruled an assertion of attorney-client privilege by a sitting president over
documents prepared by his chief attorneys; (2) asserted its own power under
the Constitution to successfully obtain the privileged information under
threat of contempt; and (3) confirmed its view that the President’s
compliance with its mandatory subpoena, after raising all available
objections, did not waive the privilege in separate proceedings.
Why would the Chief Justice hold up this particular investigation? If he
meant to suggest a broad consensus that courts could overrule committee
determinations, there is no such consensus, as the Whitewater investigation
and many others clearly demonstrate. If he intended to cite Congress’s own
research arm in support of that consensus, that claim also would have been
inaccurate since CRS has issued numerous reports, including its
Congressional Oversight Manual and many others, reflecting the opposite
position. And if he was suggesting that this has been the longstanding
position of the federal judiciary, he did not cite a single court ruling to
support that interpretation. In contrast, this alternative interpretation—that
recipients of congressional subpoenas retain the right to assert common law
privileges in other fora—directly aligns with the specific congressional
investigation the Chief Justice highlighted (the Senate Whitewater
investigation), is consistent with the only source he cited (the 2003 CRS
report), and comports with separation of powers principles, congressional
oversight precedents, and judicial rulings.
Interestingly, when the D.C. Circuit Court rejected Trump’s claim of
executive privilege before the January 6 Committee, it included in its
opinion a recounting of the Chief Justice’s discussion in Mazars on the
general scope of Congress’s investigative power.348 The opinion also
repeated the Chief Justice’s line regarding privileges, but it inserted new
text in brackets, stating that recipients of congressional subpoenas “have
long been understood [by the courts] to retain common law and
constitutional privileges.”349 Some might see this as an attempt to
retroactively distinguish the large body of congressional precedent that
appears to contradict the line in Mazars, but the D.C. Circuit Court still
347. SPEC. COMM. TO INVESTIGATE WHITEWATER DEV. CORP. AND RELATED MATTERS,
PROGRESS OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO WHITEWATER DEV. CORP. AND RELATED MATTERS AND
RECOMMENDATION FOR FUTURE FUNDING, S. REP. NO. 104-204, 17 (1996) (cited in Trump v. Mazars,
140 S. Ct. 2019, 2030–31 (2020) (noting that President Clinton “had not waived any privileges”)).
348. Trump v. Thompson, 20 F.4th 10, 24–25 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (citing Mazars, 140 S. Ct. at 2031–
36).
349. Id. at 25.
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included no judicial precedents to support its position. Instead, this
additional bracketed text also could be read as consistent with the alternative
interpretation, clarifying that courts continue to entertain assertions of
attorney-client privilege in separate litigation as they defer to congressional
committees to make their own determinations.
Admittedly, this alternative reading requires a bit of parsing. The
sentence by Chief Justice Roberts includes two parallel citations—one for
common law privileges including the attorney-client privilege and one for
constitutional privileges—without distinguishing that committees make
final decisions over the first and courts make final decisions over the
second. Yet, the sentence does recognize the distinct derivations of the two
types of privileges, and it explicitly acknowledges that the attorney-client
privilege is based in common law. In any case, the Court clearly does not
impute constitutional origins to a formerly common law privilege in the
Mazars case.350
If federal courts were charged with reexamining all committee decisions
relating to attorney-client privilege claims, they would be bound to examine
only whether the common law elements of the privilege were met, without
considering Congress’s broader legislative objectives. Courts might be
inclined to develop a balancing test to weigh the interests served by the
attorney-client privilege against Congress’s legislative purposes, but they
would not be balancing two competing constitutional powers, as they did
with Congress’s investigative power and the presidential communications
privilege in Senate Select Committee v. Nixon and Trump v. Thompson.
Instead, courts would be weighing Congress’s constitutional investigative
power against the non-constitutional, common law attorney-client privilege.
I recognize the possibility that a court in the future could break new
ground and find that the attorney-client privilege, despite historically being
recognized as a common law privilege, implicates constitutional interests in
certain narrow circumstances. In such a case, it then would be incumbent
on a court to employ the type of balancing test described above for
competing constitutional powers. After determining that the privilege
applies by assessing its common law elements, the court would be obliged
to weigh the interests served by the privilege against Congress’s
constitutional need for the information. This balancing approach would
mirror the approach used for executive privilege, which is referenced in the

350. This distinction is further supported by the sentence immediately preceding the Chief
Justice’s line, which states that recipients of congressional subpoenas “retain their constitutional rights
throughout the course of an investigation.” Mazars, 140 S. Ct. at 2032 (citing Watkins v. United States,
354 U.S. 178, 188, 198 (1957)). This sentence includes no reference to witnesses retaining their common
law privileges throughout the course of congressional investigations.
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other half of the Chief Justice’s sentence in Mazars.351 Moreover, if a court
determines in a particular case that Congress has made a sufficient showing
to overcome the constitutionally based executive privilege, that showing
also should be sufficient to overcome the attorney-client privilege in the
same or a related case.
CONCLUSION
Congress is charged with investigating private sector activities and
government operations to inform its responsibilities under the Constitution.
In limited circumstances, Congress has determined that fulfilling these core
duties requires an examination of communications between attorneys and
their clients. Because the attorney-client privilege is not based in the
Constitution, it is up to Congress to determine for itself whether it will be
recognized in committee proceedings. The judicial branch historically has
examined whether congressional subpoenas meet constitutional
requirements, but courts have refrained from imposing their own common
law procedures onto Congress when constitutional protections are not
implicated.
This is not a novel argument being put forth in the wake of the assault
on the nation’s democratic institutions by Donald Trump and his attorneys.
It has been the longstanding position of committee chairs of both political
parties. In addition to being asserted by Democratic investigative stalwarts,
such as John Dingell, Henry Waxman, Elijah Cummings, and Sam Nunn,
this position has been championed by Republicans in the House, including
Reps. Porter Goss, Jeb Henserling, Jim Leach, Thomas Bliley, and Jason
Chaffetz, and in the Senate, including Senator D’Amato, the Chair of the
Senate Whitewater Committee, and Senator Hatch, the Chair of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, in the specific investigation highlighted by Chief
Justice Roberts in Mazars.
The Supreme Court has correctly identified grave concerns with federal
courts going down the road of attempting to evaluate the wisdom of
congressional procedures rather their constitutional validity. Separation of
powers principles militate against such judicial interference, particularly
since Article I includes an explicit grant of rulemaking authority to
Congress. Absent the consent of Congress, the imposition of the judicial
branch’s attorney-client privilege onto the legislative branch would directly
contravene this admonition and impermissibly replace the judgments of
congressional committees with those of federal judges with no
constitutional predicate.
351.

Mazars, 140 S. Ct. at 2032.
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